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CONSUMER FINANCE AND INSOLVENCY
LAW IN INDIA: A CASE STUDY
Adam Feibelman ∗

I

n February 2007, justices of the Supreme Court of India issued two
remarkable opinions in the case of ICICI Bank v. Kaur. 1 Prakash
Kaur, the complainant in that case, had borrowed money from ICICI to
purchase a truck. When Kaur failed to pay installments on the loan,
agents hired by the bank took possession of the truck “by use of force.” 2
Approving a settlement of the parties’ claims, 3 Justice Altamas Kabir
wrote for the Court:
[W]e wish to make it clear that we do not appreciate the procedure
adopted by the Bank in removing the vehicle from the possession of the
writ petitioner. The practice of hiring recovery agents, who are musclemen, is deprecated and needs to be discouraged. The Bank should
resort to procedure recognised by law to take possession of vehicles in
cases where the borrower may have committed default in payment of
4
the instalments instead of taking resort to strong-arm tactics.

∗ Professor of Law, Tulane University. Thanks to Scott Baker, Lissa Broome, Adrienne
Davis, Jef Feibelman, Elizabeth Gibson, Tom Kelley, Jayanth Krishnan, Eric Muller,
Saule Omarova, Daniel Sokol, Sarah Kroll Weed, Mark Weisburd, Mark Weidemaier,
Deborah Weissman, Todd Zywicki, faculty workshop participants at University of North
Carolina School of Law and Vanderbilt Law School, participants in the international
research collaborative, “Comparative Socio/Legal Approaches to Consumer Overindebtedness, Debt Adjustment and Insolvency,” at the 2007 annual Law & Society Association meeting, participants at the 2008 America Law and Economics Association
annual meeting, and participants in the 2008 Junior Scholars Workshop on Banking Law
and Consumer Finance at the University of Connecticut School of Law. Special thanks to
Melissa Jacoby and Bill Whitford for their early encouragement with this project and to
Jim Baker, Stephanie Horton, Amol Jain, and Alexander May, for their research assistance.
1. ICICI Bank v. Kaur, (2007) 2 S.C.C. 711. ICICI Bank is one of the largest financial institutions in India. See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, INDIA COUNTRY FINANCE
2006 at 6 (2006) [hereinafter INDIA COUNTRY FINANCE 2006]; ICICI BANK,
http://www.icicibank.com/aboutus/about-us.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
2. ICICI Bank v. Kaur, (2007) 2 S.C.C. 711, 712. The opinion does not explain exactly what the agents did.
3. It appears that the court only approved the settlement reached by the parties and
did not address the legal issues asserted by Kaur. A lower court found that Kaur’s initial
petition alleged cognizable criminal offences by the Bank and its agents and that the police had violated the Indian Penal Code and the country’s Prevention of Corruption Act
by failing to pursue the allegations. Id. at 712–14 (citing Kumari v. State (N.C.T. of Delhi) and Ors., (2006) 2 S.C.C. 677).
4. Id. at 714.
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Justice A.R. Lakshmanan’s concurring opinion is even more pointed,
describing recovery agents as “independent contractors hired by the
banks both to trace the defaulters and to . . . physically, mentally and
emotionally torture and force them into submitting their dues.” 5
Here the bank gets away with everything. Young and old members of
the family are threatened on streets, [at] institutions and also at home at
godforsaken hours by these agents who have the full support of their
contractor bank . . . . [T]he method usually adopted by these institutions
is to engage [a] thug/hooligan/gangster for recovery of the twowheelers or four-wheelers. Many times even notice is not given to
them. They seize the vehicles even in public places deliberately to
cause embarrassment . . . . A recent incident has taken place when the
recovery agent had gone and threatened a school-going child for the
6
money due by the father.

These statements provide a dramatic window into broad economic and
social transformations that have been taking place in India in recent decades. In particular, they reflect the rapid expansion of consumer financial
markets in that country, the potential benefits of that expansion, and
some of the regulatory challenges it has engendered. Like other countries, especially other emerging market countries, India is currently attempting a daunting regulatory balancing act: to promote the continued
deepening of consumer financial markets while limiting the various social and economic costs of increased consumer indebtedness. The current
global economic crisis may have slowed the growth in consumer finance
in India, 7 but it also underscores the growing importance of striking the
right balance with respect to regulation of consumer finance in both developed and developing economies.
5. Id. at 715 (Lakshmanan, J., supplementing).
6. Id. at 715–17 (Lakshmanan, J., supplementing). Justice Lakshmanan’s opinion
does not provide the bases for these factual assertions about banks’ collection practices. It
is not clear whether they are based on evidence presented to the court by the parties or
based on judicial notice of personal, anecdotal knowledge. There is some evidence, however, that such activity does take place with some frequency in India, and that it is not as
rare as one might hope. In addition to the experience of Ms. Kaur, there have been various news reports of abusive and/or harassing behavior by collection agents of ICICI and
other banks. See, e.g., Ravi Bakshi, ICICI Personal Loan Customer Commits Suicide
After Alleged Harassment by Recovery Agents, PARINDA, Sept. 19, 2007, available at
http://www.parinda.com/news/crime/20070918/2025/icici-personal-loan-customercommits-suicide-after-alleged-harassment-recov (noting other stories). Justice Lakshmanan’s opinion refers to “the enormous amount of litigation pending and being filed
against the banks” arising from the action of their collection agents. ICICI Bank v. Kaur,
(2007) 2 S.C.C. 711, 716 (Lakshmanan, J., supplementing).
7. See infra note 16.
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Unfortunately for policymakers in India and in other emerging economies, legal scholars, social scientists, and development theorists have
little guidance to provide in this regard. The otherwise voluminous literature on law, finance, and development has paid relatively little attention
to the relationship between law, consumer finance, and development policy. 8
Despite this relative lack of attention, there are good reasons to believe
that the expansion of consumer financial markets can promote growth
and development. 9 It is less likely to do so, however, in the absence of a
regulatory framework that effectively facilitates an increase in consumer
lending while also limiting the associated costs of over-indebtedness. 10
Such a framework is generally drawn from a wide variety of regimes,
including banking law, general contract law, consumer protection, bankruptcy law, regulation of credit reporting, regulation of debt collection,
property exemptions, and laws affecting foreign investment. Determining
the possible combinations of legal regimes that can promote efficient
expansion of consumer lending in emerging economies is a crucial if relatively unexplored project for scholars of law, finance, and development.
In previous work, I have argued that an effective consumer bankruptcy
system can be an especially effective component of a regulatory framework that promotes growth and development in emerging economies. 11
8. See Adam Feibelman, Consumer Bankruptcy as Development Policy, 39 SETON
HALL L. REV. 63, 74 (2009); see also Iain D.C. Ramsay, Functionalism and Political
Economy in the Comparative Study of Consumer Insolvency: An Unfinished Story From
England and Wales, 7 THEOR. INQS. L. 625, 642–43 (2006) [hereinafter Ramsay, Functionalism and Political Economy in the Comparative Study of Consumer Insolvency].
Thus, for example, while it has been established that financial deepening in general promotes economic growth, it remains uncertain what contribution the deepening of consumer financial markets makes to this dynamic. See Feibelman, supra note 8, at 74.
9. Expanding access to consumer finance can enable individuals to increase basic
consumption of goods and services (potentially expanding consumption of domestic
goods and services), to obtain and accumulate household assets, to make investments in
personal capital (especially health and education), and to fund nascent profit-making
ventures. Furthermore, it may broaden popular support for development policies. See
Feibelman, supra note 8, at 75–79.
10. See id. at 79–81.
11. See generally Feibelman, supra note 8. See also John Armour & Douglas Cumming, Bankruptcy Law and Entrepreneurship, 10 AM. L. ECON. REV. 303 (2008) (finding
that a relatively forgiving consumer bankruptcy regime can enhance entrepreneurship).
Furthermore, the current global crisis has brought increased attention to consumer insolvency law as a potential tool for crisis resolution. See, e.g., Int’l Monetary Fund [IMF],
United States: 2008 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report, para. 32, IMF Country Report
No.
08/255
(July
2008),
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08255.pdf (proposing that policymakers
in the United States consider reforming consumer bankruptcy law to allow for “cram-
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This Article provides a case study of consumer finance and of the potential role for consumer bankruptcy or insolvency12 law in the context of
contemporary India. In particular, it explores whether and how that country might benefit from reforming its existing consumer insolvency laws.
As Part I describes, formal consumer financial markets in India have
been growing at dramatic rates in recent years. 13 It is not surprising that
the expansion of these markets has coincided with impressive growth in
the Indian economy, which averaged over 7% growth in gross domestic
product per year between 1997 and the onset of the recent global economic crisis. 14 In the years just before the crisis, that growth exceeded
9%. 15 While the global crisis has adversely affected the country’s economy, 16 India has suffered less than most countries and has been among
the first to begin to regain stability. 17 Barring an unexpected reversal, the
country appears poised to enjoy growth rates of nearly 7% and 8% in the
next two years, respectively. 18
downs” of home mortgages). Cf. Luc Laeven & Thomas Laryea, Principles of Household
Debt Restructuring, IMF Staff Position Note, SPN/09/15, June 26, 2009, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn0915.pdf (arguing that government
intervention may be necessary in many countries to address high levels of household
debt, but also arguing that such intervention may not be achievable through domestic
bankruptcy systems).
12. Usage of the terms “bankruptcy” and “insolvency” creates much conceptual confusion. There is a tendency to use “bankruptcy” to refer to the financial affairs of individuals and “insolvency” to those of corporations. It is probably more accurate to distinguish
“bankruptcy” as a legal process or procedure and “insolvency” as a financial state of
affairs (for individuals as well as commercial entities). These distinctions are not important for present purposes, and the terms bankruptcy and insolvency are used interchangeably in this Article.
13. See infra notes 25–48 and accompanying text.
14. See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACT BOOK: INDIA, available
at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html.
15. See, e.g., Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2007, at 170–75
(2007)
[hereinafter
Asian
Development
Outlook
2007],
available
at
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2007/IND.pdf.
16. See, e.g., Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2009: Rebalancing
Asia’s
Growth,
at
197–201,
available
at
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2009/IND.pdf (“The Indian economy is
facing major macroeconomic management challenges stemming from the global financial
crisis. Declining private investment, dwindling capital inflows, shrinking foreign exchange reserves, weakening exports, and a depreciating rupee are some of the factors
constraining high growth.”) India’s GDP grew by just over 5% in 2008. See id. at 197.
17. IMF, IMF Executive Board Concludes 2009 Article IV Consultation With India,
IMF
Public
Information
Notice,
Feb.
4,
2010,
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2010/pn1018.htm (“India’s economy is one of the
first in the world to recover after the global crisis.”).
18. See id.
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If the growth in India’s broader economy caused consumer financial
markets in that country to expand, there are reasons to believe that causation flows in the other direction as well—that growth in consumer financial markets has contributed to broader growth in the Indian economy. In
any event, policymakers in India have done much in recent years to support formal domestic markets for consumer finance. Part II describes
some of these efforts and the main pillars of the legal and regulatory
framework that currently applies to consumer financial markets in India.
As the Kaur opinion suggests, however, the country has done less to
adopt reforms or policies designed to limit the costs of expanding consumer finance. As a result, there are signs that the Indian economy is currently experiencing, or is becoming increasingly vulnerable to, a variety
of costs related to expanding consumer finance, especially consumer
over-indebtedness. Limited available data suggest, for example, that loan
default rates are increasing, that aggressive debt collection has become
ubiquitous, and that debt-related imprisonment 19 and debt bondage 20 continue to plague Indian citizens. Among other things, these circumstances
may dissuade some households from productive borrowing in the first
place and may undermine popular support for broader development policies. 21
Against this background, Part III examines the current and potential
role of consumer insolvency law in India. Unlike other major emerging
economies—most notably, Brazil and China—India has had a formally
comprehensive consumer insolvency regime in place throughout its independent legal existence. 22 India’s existing insolvency laws were
enacted during its colonial era and, at least on paper, provide a significant measure of protection and debt relief to individual debtors. They
give courts relatively broad powers to stay enforcement and collection
actions against debtors and allow for the discharge of an insolvent’s unsecured debts.
Yet the scope of consumer insolvency laws in India is subject to many
formal and practical limitations. The requirements for protection under
the laws are rather cumbersome and require a series of judicial determinations. Many of these determinations are subject to significant judicial
discretion, which appear to make application of the laws unpredictable.
19. See infra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
20. See id.
21. See, e.g., Feibelman, supra note 8, at 94–95 (arguing that the availability of debt
relief may encourage consumers to borrow and may limit popular dissatisfaction with
development policies).
22. See, e.g., Rafael Efrat, The Evolution of Bankruptcy Stigma, 7 THEOR. INQ. L. 365,
372 (2006).
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As a practical matter, like most litigation in that country, insolvency cases in India proceed extremely slowly through the judicial system, a pace
that is exacerbated by the number of judicial actions required to trigger
protections and relief under the laws.
Despite these limitations, it appears that some debtors and creditors in
India do employ the country’s insolvency laws. While there are no available systemic data on consumer and household insolvency proceedings
in India, and while most insolvency proceedings are unreported, some
consumer insolvency cases are decided by the country’s high courts each
year and published. 23 These decisions alone do not support reliable conclusions about the insolvency system in India, but they do provide an
intriguing glimpse into that system. They indicate that India’s insolvency
regime is, at least, a functioning part of that country’s legal system. They
also suggest that consumer insolvencies may be more common than observers outside the system might anticipate. 24 Nonetheless, beyond these
relatively few reported decisions, there is little available evidence that
India’s consumer insolvency laws are currently an important legal institution in that society. Thus, assuming that consumer insolvency or bankruptcy law can, in theory, promote the deepening consumer financial
markets, it seems doubtful that it currently plays this role in India.
With effective reforms, however, consumer insolvency law may have
the potential to play a more beneficial role in India. Part III proposes that
even modest reforms to India’s insolvency laws could increase their role
in regulating debt collection and providing consumer debt relief. While
increasing the general capacity of the country’s legal system would likely
improve the functioning of its insolvency laws, such improvements may
not be necessary to meaningfully alter the role that consumer insolvency
law plays in the Indian economy. Policymakers could, for example,
streamline aspects of the insolvency regime to make some provisions—
such as discharge and the stay on other proceedings—more automatic
and to reduce the judicial functions required at each step of an insolvency
case. Such improvements could, in theory, increase the insolvency returns to creditors, provide additional social insurance for consumers and
households, and increase the demand for consumer finance.
To be clear, however, this Article does not advocate any particular reforms, nor does it suggest that Indian policymakers simply transplant
rules or doctrines from other jurisdictions. Rather, this Article argues that
India may provide an example of an emerging economy that could benefit from expanding and improving the role of its consumer insolvency
23. See infra notes 216–19 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 219–21 and accompanying text.
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law. Thus, the primary goal of this Article is to help spur further study of
India’s consumer financial markets and of the operation of its insolvency
system to confirm or refute that hypothesis. If confirmed, that information might increase the demand for effective consumer insolvency law in
India (and elsewhere). To be effective, India’s insolvency law must be
sensitive to its particular context, including unique practical, cultural,
sociological, and economic aspects of Indian society. In that regard, the
fact that India already has a functioning, perhaps familiar, consumer insolvency system provides some reason for optimism that policymakers
could transform the existing system into one that contributes more to social welfare in that country.
I. CONSUMER FINANCE IN INDIA
The concerns of Justice Kabir and Justice Lakshmanan in ICICI Bank
v. Kaur 25 should be read against a background of dramatic increases in
consumer financial transactions in India over the past two decades. Before the 1980’s, non-agriculture-related consumer credit was available
from some formal lenders, but it was relatively scarce. During that period, the overall amount of capital in the economy was modest, and credit
allocation by financial institutions was largely directed by the state.26
Individuals and households could borrow from state-controlled lenders,
but most borrowed from informal sources, especially from largely unregulated professional and informal moneylenders.27 Overall borrowing for
non-agricultural purposes was quite modest, and much of it was used to
fund lifecycle events, such as weddings, births, and deaths.
A formal market for consumer finance began emerging in India in the
1980’s, and it has expanded rapidly during the past decade.28 While information about consumer credit in India is far from comprehensive,
there are two important sources of such data, both of which are illuminating. One of these, India’s National Sample Survey Organization
(“NSSO”), conducts a survey of household assets and indebtedness every
ten years. 29 The last survey was conducted in 2002 to 2003. From these

25. See ICICI Bank v. Kaur, (2007) 2 S.C.C. 711.
26. See infra notes 54 & 63 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 41 & 102–06 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
29. The NSSO, in the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India, conducts the All-India Debt and Investment Survey (“AIDIS”). This is
a series of surveys, the most recent of which was conducted during January to December
2003. It is apparently the only information available about Indian household assets, liabilities and expenditures nationwide. Government of India National Sample Survey Organi-
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surveys, we know that between 1981 and 2002, household indebtedness
(existing and new borrowing combined) increased nearly 2000%, from
Rs. 9,100 crore (approximately $2 billion) to Rs. 176,700 crore (approximately $40 billion).30 According to the NSSO survey, new borrowing,
rural and urban, for the year 2002 to 2003 was Rs. 89,300 crore (approximately $20 billion).31
The other important source of data on consumer finance in India, the
Reserve Bank of India, tracks yearly changes in household assets and
liabilities for which formal institutions are counter-parties. According to
Reserve Bank’s Handbook of Statistics, the yearly net increase in total
financial liabilities of households in India grew nearly six-fold between
2000 and 2007. 32 These figures suggest that total indebtedness was continuing to increase at a dramatic rate before the current economic crisis,
as most borrowing in India is for the medium to long term. 33 Not surprisingly, there are significant differences in the financial profiles of rural
and urban households in India. As a general matter, rural households—
both cultivators and non-cultivators—are more likely to have financial
liabilities than urban households, and urban households with liabilities
owe more than their rural counterparts. 34 The percentage of urban households reporting indebtedness remained steady between 1981 and 2002,
but the amount of those households’ indebtedness increased significant-

zation [NSSO], Household Capital Expenditure in India (2006), available at
http://www.mospi.nic.in/nss_press_note_504.htm (household data).
30. NSSO, Household Assets and Liabilities in India as on 30.06.2002, Report No.
500 (Nov. 2005) [hereinafter Household Assets and Liabilities in India].
31. NSSO, Household Borrowings and Repayments in India from 1.7.2002 to
30.6.2003, at 16, Report No. 502 (Jan. 2006).
32. Reserve Bank of India, Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, Handbook of
Statistics
on
Indian
Economy,
Sept.
15,
2009,
available
at
http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AnnualPublications.aspx?head=Handbook%20of%20Statist
ics%20on%20Indian%20Economy (follow “Table 11: Changes in Financial Assets/Liabilities of the Household Sector (At Current Prices)” hyperlink). Changes in
household liabilities in 2000–01 were Rs. 31,779 crore; in 2005–06, they were Rs.
183,424 crore. See id. Since 2006, this figure has been dropping slightly, likely due in
part to the global credit crisis. It is projected to be Rs. 165,656 crore for 2008–09. See id.
33. NSSO, Household Indebtedness in India as on 30.06.2002, Report No. 501, 59th
Round (Dec. 2005) [hereinafter Household Indebtedness in India].
34. As of 2002, 26.5% of rural households were indebted, and these indebted households had an average amount of debt of Rs. 28,449. Household Assets and Liabilities in
India, supra note 30, at 30. In rural areas, cultivator households were more likely to be
indebted than non-cultivators (29.7% to 21.8%) and they had more debt on average (Rs.
9,300 to Rs. 5,000, per all rural households). Id.
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ly. 35 As a result of these factors, the urban share of the nation’s consumer
borrowing has increased in recent years. 36 While these figures include
business-related borrowing by households, 37 it appears that increasing
numbers of Indians are currently using credit to finance housing38 and to
obtain a growing variety of services and goods. As the case of Prakash
Kaur reflects, a significant portion of the increase in consumer lending
has been used to purchase durable goods, especially automobiles and
motorcycles. 39 There is also evidence that the high average yearly growth
in non-food credit in India between 2002 and 2006 (28.8%) was fueled
by increases in retail credit.40
35. In 1981, 17.4% of urban households were indebted and the average amount of
debt per all urban households was Rs. 1,000. In 2002, 17.8% of urban households were
indebted and the average amount of debt per all urban households was Rs. 11,771. Id. at
35. Urban indebted households had a higher average debt (Rs. 66,129) than rural households (Rs. 28,449). Id. at 30. In urban areas, self-employed and nonself-employed urban
households were equally likely to be indebted and had roughly the same amount of average debt per urban household (Rs. 12,100 to Rs. 11,600, per all urban households). Id.
36. Household Indebtedness in India, supra note 33. As of 2002, rural households
represented 73% of national population and held 63% of total household debt; urban
households represented 27% of the population and held 37% of overall household debt.
Id.
37. As of 2002, approximately 60% of rural households are cultivators—i.e., farmers—and another 5% are artisans; approximately 36% of urban households are designated as “self-employed.” Household Assets and Liabilities in India, supra note 30, at 13.
Approximately 25% of debt incurred by urban households and 53% of debt incurred by
rural households is used for a business purpose. Household Indebtedness in India, supra
note 33, at 39.
38. These figures include consumer debt used for housing finance, although it is impossible to determine precisely how much is borrowed for this purpose. As of 2002, 35%
of debt incurred by rural households and 58% of debt incurred by urban households was
used for “household expenditure,” a category which includes housing finance among
many other things. Household Indebtedness in India, supra note 33. There are reasons to
believe that much of this expenditure was related to housing finance. Roughly 22% of all
outstanding debt in 2002 was secured by a first mortgage on immovable property and
nearly the same amount of outstanding debt was secured by other mortgages on immovable property. Id. at 39.
39. See, e.g, Akash Gupta & Rahul Agarwal, The Consumer Financing Business in
India: Building Blocks for the Future, (Dec. 2003) (unpublished article), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=619721 (reporting that 70% of auto
sales in India were being financed as of 2003).
40. Rakesh Mohan, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, Address at the
Annual Bankers’ Conference, Hyderbad, Economic Growth, Financial Deepening and
Financial
Inclusion,
at
1–2
(Nov.
3,
2006),
available
at
http://www.bis.org/review/r061121e.pdf. From 2002 to 2006, retail credit grew by 46%;
retail credit share of all bank credit increased from 6% in 1991 to 25.5% in 2006. Id. at 3.
Mohan suggests that the expansion of credit in recent years has been funded by banks
“unwinding their surplus investments in government securities.” Id.
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As discussed below, professional and informal moneylenders continue
to play a significant role in the nation’s economy. 41 Yet much of the increase in consumer lending has been from banks and other non-bank financial institutions. The percentage of the debt of urban households held
by institutional lenders increased consistently since 1981—totaling 60%
of household indebtedness in 1981, 72% in 1991, and 75% in 2002. 42 It
appears that revolving consumer credit facilities, especially the use of
credit cards, are helping to fuel this trend. 43 International credit card
companies like Visa and Mastercard and their related lenders have identified India as one of the most promising of emerging markets. Before the
recent global economic crisis, there were 28 million credit cards in the

41. See infra notes 102–06 and accompanying text. When last measured, these lenders were responsible for 29.6% of credit extended to rural households and 14.1% of credit
extended to urban households. The most common of these relatively informal lenders are
pawnbrokers, followed in significance by input suppliers, “commission agents,” “kirana
shopkeepers,” and “lenders against land.” RBI, Report of the Technical Group, infra note
98. They tend to lend for short terms, and the proceeds of their loans are often used for
consumption, farming, and social obligations (e.g., weddings, births, deaths). See Household Indebtedness in India, supra note 33, at 32. Most of their loans are secured by jewelry and interests in land (including cultivation rights), but many are effectively unsecured.
See id.
42. Household Indebtedness in India, supra note 33, at 25. The share of lending to
rural households remained steady over this period and actually decreased in 2002 (61%,
64%, and 57% in 1981, 1991, 2002, respectively). Id. The most active lenders to Indian
households include cooperative societies and cooperative banks (who hold 27.3% of debt
owed by rural households and 20.5% of debt owed by urban households); commercial
banks (24.5% and 29.7%); government entities (2.3% and 7.6%); non-bank financial
institutions (1.1% and 7%); “agricultural money lenders” (10% and .9%); professional
money lenders (19.6% and 13.2%); traders (2.6% and 1%); and relatives & friends (7.1%
and 7.6%). Id. at 29. Poorer households tend to borrow from non-institutional lenders;
richer ones tend to borrow from institutional lenders. Id. at 18–19. The rates that households pay for credit vary significantly, depending upon their demographic characteristics,
income, and the type of creditor they borrow from. Most rural borrowers pay rates between 12% and 25%, and most urban borrowers pay less than that—between 6% and
20%. Id. at 34. Non-institutional lenders charge significantly higher rates—40% of noninstitutional lenders charge 30% plus; 32% of non-institutional urban lenders charge rates
in that range. Id.
43. As the McKinsey Group notes, “There has been a four-fold increase in credit-card
penetration in India, from 2.5% in 2001 to 8.1% in 2005.” JONATHAN ABLETT ET AL.,
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., THE ‘BIRD OF GOLD’: THE RISE OF INDIA’S CONSUMER MARKET
55
(2007),
available
at
http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/india_consumer_market/index.asp.
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country; after a sharp drop in cards in the Indian economy, the number of
cards began to rise again, reaching 19.3 million. 44
Despite these large numbers, however, credit card penetration rates are
relatively low in India compared to other comparable developing economies, especially others in its region.45 This reflects the broader fact that
while the overall amount of consumer borrowing has increased dramatically in recent years, the incidence of indebtedness among Indian households—the percentage of households that are indebted—is still relatively
low. 46 Furthermore, while debt-to-asset ratios for Indian households that
report borrowing money are rising for all Indian households except selfemployed urban households, 47 they are also relatively low. 48 The facts
suggest that there is potential for significant expansion of consumer borrowing in India in the future, especially as the number of households at
poverty level in that country decreases.
II. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A variety of legal and regulatory reforms, especially reforms made
over the last decade or so, appear to have helped facilitate India’s general
economic expansion and the growth of consumer finance in that country.
This Part notes some of the most important policies and legal developments that have helped spur the expansion of consumer finance in that
country. It also describes some of the policies and legal regimes that India has adopted to limit the costs of increasing availability of consumer
finance, especially over-indebtedness. This Part concludes that Indian
policymakers have thus far been more attentive to expanding consumer
financial markets than to limiting the resulting costs of that expansion.

44. Sudeep Jain, Credit Card Base Base UP After 18 Months, BUS. STAND., June 14,
2010, available at http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/credit-card-baseafter18-months/398102/.
45. Gaurie Mishra, Credit Card Use In India Lowest In World, THE ECONOMIC TIMES,
May
31,
2007,
available
at
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2088097.cms (noting that fewer affluent individuals have credit cards in India than in other countries in that region); Victoria
Conroy, Country Survey—India: India’s Card Growth Set to Soar, CARDS INT’L (2007).
46. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
47. See Household Assets and Liabilities in India, supra note 30, at 40.
48. These ratios are 2.5% and 4.6% for cultivator and non-cultivator rural households,
respectively; 2.2% and 3.4% for self-employed and non-self-employed urban households,
respectively. Id. at 37. But broken down by asset class, this ratio gets much higher for
poorer borrowers. Id. Not surprisingly, households with the most assets owe most of the
country’s consumer debt. Id.
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A. Liberalization of the Indian Financial Sector
As a number of writers have commented, India has followed a somewhat idiosyncratic path of economic development, 49 and that country’s
experience over the last few decades has indeed been uncommon in
many respects. Unlike most other large post-colonial states, India
emerged from British control with many institutions that development
economists have identified as preconditions for economic growth. 50 It
49. See, e.g., Kalpana Kochhar, Utsav Kumar, Raghuram Rajan, Arvind Subramanian, & Ioannia Tokatlidis, India’s Pattern of Development: What Happened, What Follows?, 36 (IMF, Working Paper WP/06/22, Jan. 2006); Ablett et al., supra note 43, at 23.
While India has enjoyed growth in manufacturing, trade, and foreign investment, it is
lagging behind other developing economies in each of these categories. The service sector (which includes information technology services) appears to be driving growth in the
country’s gross domestic product. See Raghbendra Jha, The Political Economy of Recent
Economic Growth in India, 4 (Austral. South Asia Research Ctr., Working Paper
2004/12,
2004)
[hereinafter
Jha,
FDI
Flows],
available
at
http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/asarc/2004_12.pdf; Ablett et al., supra note 43, at 24. See
also Reserve Bank of India, Annual Policy Statement for the Year 2007–2008, at 3 (2007)
[hereinafter RBI, Annual Policy Statement 2007–2008], available at
http://www.rbi.org.in/SCRIPTs/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=3445&Mode=0; Asian Development Outlook 2007, supra note 15, at 170. Growth in services is not just, or even primarily, a result of the country’s growing information technology sector. See James Gordon & Poonam Gupta, Understanding India’s Services Revolution, 9 (2003), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/apd/seminars/2003/newdelhi/gordon.pdf. In fact, the
banking sector is one of the fastest growing sectors. Id. According to conventional theories of development economics, economic development requires structural transformations that generally unfold in a predictable sequence—services are conventionally supposed to comprise a relatively small part of the economy of a developing state and then a
larger part as the state’s economy grows. See id. at 4–6. See also JAMES M. CYPHER &
JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 299 (2d ed. 2004) (citing
Gustav Ranis, Challenges and Opportunities Posed by Asia’s Superexporters: Implications for Manufactured Exports from Latin America, Q. REV. ECON. & BUS. 21 (1981));
World Bank, The East Asian Miracle, World Development Report (1993)). India’s
stronger states are arguably “skipping a stage” by fostering high growth in the service
sector. Kochhar et al., supra note 49, at 26; Gordon & Gupta, supra note 49, at 7–8.
50. See Kochhar et al., supra note 49, at 27; John Williamson & R. Zagha, From
Hindu Rate of Growth to the Hindu Rate of Reform, 2 (Stanford Univ. Ctr. for Research
on Econ. Dev. & Policy Reform, Working Paper No. 144, 2002). The importance of human and social institutions is a major theme in contemporary development theory. Early
theorists in this vein include Clarence Ayres and Gunnar Myrdal. CYPHER & DIETZ, supra
note 49, at 171–77. More recently, the work of Douglass North has made enormous contributions in this direction. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, THE ECONOMIC GROWTH OF
THE UNITED STATES 1790 TO 1860 (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1961); DOUGLASS C.
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990). See
also Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, Nobel Prize Lecture
(Dec.
9,
1993),
available
at
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1993/north-lecture.html. Official
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was an advanced democracy with a relatively effective education system,
experienced civil servants, a nationwide railroad system, and a functioning judiciary. 51 Despite its enviable array of relatively advanced institutions, India did not enjoy strong economic growth in the decades after its
independence. 52 In this period, through the 1970’s, India’s rate of growth
was not only disappointing given its institutional endowments, it underperformed compared to other developing countries with weaker institutions. 53 The conventional explanation for this economic performance is
that, post-independence, economic growth in India was hampered by rigid government controls over the economy. 54
development organizations have largely adopted this focus. See, e.g., World Bank, The
State in a Changing World, World Development Report (1997) (articulating an institutional approach to economic development).
51. Today, India is the world’s most populous democracy. With a population of just
over one billion citizens, it has a constitutional, federal system of government. THE
WORLD FACT BOOK: INDIA, supra note 14. India’s constitution provides for a federal government with separation of powers between legislative, judicial, and executive branches.
Id. The nation is comprised of twenty-eight states and seven territories, governed by a bicameral legislative body at the national level, and the separate states also have legislative
bodies of their own. Id. Like other legal systems based on the English model, India has a
common law legal system, but also has extensive legislative schemes at the national and
state levels. Id. There is a national supreme court and each state has its own high court as
well. Id.
52. Dani Rodrik & Arvind Subramanium, From “Hindu Growth” to Productivity
Surge: The Mystery of the Indian Growth Transition, 3 (IMF, Working Paper No. 04/77,
2004) [hereinafter Rodrik & Subramanium, Hindu Growth], available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=17313.0; Williamson & Zagha,
supra note 50, at 2; Dani Rodrik & Arvind Subramaniam, Why India Can Grow at Seven
Percent a Year or More: Projections and Reflections, 39 ECON. & POL. WKLY., 1591
(2004).
53. Kochhar et al., supra note 49, at 17 (noting that in the early 1980’s India did not
use enough available labor and employed capital inefficiently). As an aside, India is often
said to have experienced a “Hindu” rate of growth in this period. This phrase seems illchosen, and hopefully it will lose its currency.
54. Under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, India became a
quasi-communist/socialist state. In 1954, India’s legislature explicitly committed the
nation to socialism. See Williamson & Zagha, supra note 50, at 3. For an excellent general history of the country since independence, see RAMACHANDRA GUHA, INDIA AFTER
GANDHI: THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD’S LARGEST DEMOCRACY (2007). India’s policies in
this era have been characterized as combining Soviet-style industrialism, British-style
trade unionism and welfare-statism, and colonial socio-economic stratification. See generally Ramgopal Agarwala & Zafar Dad Khan, Labor Market and Social Insurance Policy in India: A Case of Losing on Both Competitiveness and Caring, World Bank (1997),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/wbi37168.pdf. Others
have described India’s socialism as similar to Fabian socialism, in contrast to Marxism, it
“aimed not to destroy capitalism but merely to mitigate the social ills it caused.” Tarun
Khanna & Yasheng Huang, Can India Overtake China?, FOREIGN POLICY, July-Aug.,
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In the 1980’s, India began a transformative period of liberalization.
The initial round of reforms instituted by Indian policy-makers in the
1980’s was designed to make it easier to conduct business in the country
by loosening at least some of the government’s controls on economic
activity. 55 The major reforms of that period allowed more imports and
foreign investment; increased the number of goods that were subject to
open licensing; liberalized access to credit; improved tax incentives for
export ventures; relaxed licensing requirements for domestic industrial
activities; and removed some price controls for commercial inputs (like
cement and aluminum). 56 This initial round of reforms was thus largely
internally focused and was arguably the product of domestic political
pressures. 57 These seemingly modest reforms are often overlooked, 58 but
they appear to have been consequential—both in economic effect and in
building political support within the polity for liberalization in general.59
India experienced another important, and much more prominent, round
of legal reforms in the 1990’s that further loosened government control
of the economy. 60 If the earlier reforms were pro-business, the reforms of

2003, at 76. Most sectors of the economy, including the banking sector, were nationalized
to some extent; prices and production policies were centrally determined; financial firms
enjoyed little operational discretion, and foreign investment was largely excluded from
the economy. Williamson & Zagha, supra note 50, at 3 (noting that banks were nationalized in the 1960’s and 1970’s).
55. Kochhar et al., supra note 49, at 18–19 (discussing India’s economic reforms of
the 1980’s); Williamson & Zagha, supra note 50, at 1, 7 (noting that contemporary Indian
growth started in the 1980’s—additional growth in the 1990’s was modest). For a discussion of the conditions that led to the India reforms of the 1980’s, see Williamson & Zagha, supra note 50, at 6–7 (noting that these reforms were made in the wake of a sizeable
IMF loan and were the product of self-imposed conditionality for the IMF loan). See also
Praveen Chaudry, Vijay Kelkar & Vikash Yadav, The Evolution of ‘Home-Grown Conditionality’ in India: IMF Relations, 40 J. DEV. STUD. 59, 59–81 (2004).
56. Kochhar et al., supra note 49, at 18–19; Williamson & Zagha, supra note 50, at 7.
In the late 1980’s the transport/trucking industry was largely liberalized, which had farreaching effects on the Indian economy. See id.
57. See Rodrik & Subramanium, Hindu Growth, supra note 52, at 25 (describing
these reforms as “internal liberalization”).
58. See Williamson & Zagha, supra note 50, at 7 (observing that the growth normally
associated with the reforms of the 1990’s actually began in the 1980’s).
59. See id.
60. See John Armour & Priya Lele, Law, Finance, and Politics: The Case of India,
LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 491, 492 (2009); Kochhar et al., supra note 49, at 18–19; Khanna &
Huang, supra note 54, at 77–78. These reforms were largely spurred by a near-financial
crisis and a looming default on external obligations. This near-crisis of the early 1990’s
was arguably the product of flaws in the development and reform policies of the 1980’s
discussed above. See Williamson & Zagha, supra note 50, at 8.
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the 1990’s were more generally pro-market. 61 These reforms further dismantled industrial licensing requirements; eliminated public sector monopolies in certain industries; allowed for an increase in foreign direct
investment and foreign portfolio investments; liberalized the terms of
India’s trade abroad, including the lowering of tariffs and the elimination
of import-licensing requirements; and, as discussed below, altered the
regulation of financial services in various ways. 62
Liberalizing the country’s financial services involved reversing the nationalization of the banking sector. In 1991, domestic public sector banks
controlled nearly all of the country’s deposits, the government set interest rates, and banks’ use of funds was largely predetermined. 63 In recent
years, the market share of private banks has increased, 64 and the statecontrolled banks are now at least partly open to private investors. 65
Banks also enjoy significantly more operational freedom than they did
twenty years ago, 66 and rates that banks can charge for credit have been
largely deregulated.67
The process of liberalization also included a set of reforms to allow
more foreign participation in the financial sector. The Reserve Bank of
India, which has regulatory authority over banks and other non-bank in-

61. See Kochhar et al., supra note 49, at 5–7, 18–19 (making the pro-business/promarket distinction). Before 1991, “India had one of the world’s most controlled investment regimes.” Williamson & Zagha, supra note 50, at 3. Before 1991, only the government could invest in certain sectors, including coal, power, telecommunications, insurance, mining, and oil. Government approval was required for investment in industrial
firms. Nearly 1,000 goods could only be produced by “small-scale” companies. Foreign
investment “was banned from some sectors,” and foreign-owned firms were only allowed
domestic financing. Id. at 3–4.
62. See Kochhar et al., supra note 49, at 18–19; Williamson & Zagha, supra note 50,
at 8–9. Foreign direct investment involves ownership of assets in another country, and
foreign portfolio investment involves investment in or lending to a foreign venture.
CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 49, at 410. The reforms included currency devaluation and
reduction in public expenditures, and also included significant reforms of the tax system.
See Williamson & Zagha, supra note 50, at 8.
63. See Williamson & Zagha, supra note 50, at 4–6; Christian Roland, Banking Sector Liberalization in India, 3–4 (2006) (unpublished article), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=877811.
64. See Roland, supra note 63, at 10.
65. INDIA COUNTRY FINANCE 2006, supra note 1, at 11 (noting that private investment
cannot exceed 49% of the state controlled banks’ capital).
66. Id.
67. Loans for over Rs. 200,000 can be made at market rates; loans for less than that
amount cannot exceed banks’ “prime lending rate,” but are otherwise unregulated. See
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, INDIA COUNTRY FINANCE 2009, at 9 (2009) [hereinafter
INDIA COUNTRY FINANCE 2009]; Roland, supra note 63, at 5.
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stitutions, began to allow foreign bank branches in the early 1990’s.68
Under pressure from abroad, it has committed to allow a handful of new
foreign bank branches per year. As of 2009, thirty foreign banks were
operating 273 branches in India, and thirty-four other foreign banks were
operating representative offices in the country. 69 Foreign banks are now
allowed to hold some modest ownership stakes in private and stateowned domestic banks. 70
While these actions reflect meaningful changes in the architecture of
the country’s financial sector,71 that sector is still subject to significant
government controls, 72 it is still dominated by state controlled institutions, 73 and foreign participation in the sector remains relatively modest. 74 For example, foreign banks with domestic branches are prohibited

68. See INDIA COUNTRY FINANCE 2006, supra note 1, at 17.
69. INDIA COUNTRY FINANCE 2009, supra note 67, at 15.
70. See infra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
71. See Khanna & Huang, supra note 54, at 78 (arguing that capital markets and legal
systems are more advanced in India than in China).
72. INDIA COUNTRY FINANCE 2009, supra note 67, at 9 (“Domestic banks must devote
at least 40% of their loan portfolio to designated priority sectors . . . and 12% to export
financing . . . . Foreign banks are required to lend 32% of net credit to priority sectors . . .
. ”); Roland, supra note 63, at 5.
73. INDIA COUNTRY FINANCE 2009, supra note 67, at 12 (noting that “[India’s] 28
state-owned banks . . . controlled 69.9% of assets in the [financial] sector . . . . ”).
74. These limitations on foreign investment in India’s financial sector reflect the relatively low rate of foreign investment in India in general. Although there was a flurry of
increased foreign investment in the Indian economy in the 1990’s, see INDIA COUNTRY
FINANCE 2006, supra note 1, at 5–6, the country still attracts relatively little foreign investment compared to other developing countries. See Raghbendra Jha, Recent Trends in
FDI Flows and Prospects for India, 1–2 (Austl. Nat’l Univ. Working Paper, Aug. 2003),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=431927; Rohit Sachdev,
Note, Comparing the Legal Foundations of Foreign Direct Investment in India and China: Law and the Rule of Law in the Indian Foreign Direct Investment Context, 2006
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 167, 168 (2006) (noting that China does better with FDI). See also
Ablett et al., supra note 43, at 23. For a good summary of “incoming direct investment,”
see INDIA COUNTRY FINANCE 2009, supra note 67, at 45. The United States is the largest
investor in India. See Jha, FDI Flows, supra note 49, at 5. This relatively low rate of foreign investment is due in large part to direct legal constraints. India’s regulation of foreign investment continues to be robust and complex. Sachdev, supra note 74, at 169,
187–90. See also INDIA COUNTRY FINANCE 2009, supra note 67, at 45. For a good discussion of the regulatory role of the RBI and the Ministry of Finance, see INDIA COUNTRY
FINANCE 2006, supra note 1, at 6–9. In fact, recent legislative acts in India appear to tighten some restraints on foreign investment, Sachdev, supra note 74, at 195–96, and the
Congress Party appears to be slowing down some recent efforts to attract foreign investment. See INDIA COUNTRY FINANCE 2006, supra note 1, at 5. It is worth noting, however,
that India’s relative insulation from international capital markets is credited for helping
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from owning more than 5% of the equity of another bank. 75 Foreign direct investment in domestic private banks is limited to 10% per investor
(or related group) and total foreign direct investment in any domestic
bank cannot exceed 74% of ownership. 76 Largely due to these various
limitations and strong competition from new private domestic banks, 77
some foreign banks actually began leaving the market for financial services in India in the period before the current crisis. 78 And, responding to
the global economic crisis, the Reserve Bank of India stated in 2009 that
it would temporarily halt efforts to increase foreign banks’ presence in
the country. 79
India has also liberalized its financial sector by adopting a set of reforms that enable lenders in India to enforce their obligations more
quickly and predictably. 80 A growing body of scholarship supports the
basic claim that effective legal protections for lenders and investors tend
to promote economic growth. 81 In the absence of such mechanisms, returns on investment are more uncertain, which increases the cost of capital or makes it altogether unavailable. Thus, legal regimes like bankrupt-

the country weather the recent global crisis. INDIA COUNTRY FINANCE 2009, supra note
67, at 3.
75. INDIA COUNTRY FINANCE 2006, supra note 1, at 14.
76. Id.
77. See INDIA COUNTRY FINANCE 2006, supra note 1, at 16. Twelve new private domestic banks have been licensed by the Reserve Bank since 1993. Id.
78. See id. at 15 (including chart of top 10 foreign banks).
79. INDIA COUNTRY FINANCE 2009, supra note 67, at 15.
80. See INDIA COUNTRY FINANCE 2006, supra note 1, at 12; V. Gopalakrishna & S.
Ravi, Legal Framework for Housing Finance: An Appraisal, 5 ICFAI J. BANKING L. 9
(2007); Anshu S. K. Pasricha, Comment, On Financial Sector Reform in Emerging Markets: Enhancing Creditors’ Rights and Securitizing Non-performing Loans in the Indian
Banking Sector—An Elephant’s Tale, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 325 (2007); Sumant Batra, Insolvency Laws In South Asia: Recent Trends and Developments, OECD (2006) [hereinafter
Batra,
Insolvency
Laws
In
South
Asia],
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/14/38184124.pdf (summarizing recent developments in
India); SUMANT BATRA, THE INDIAN INSOLVENCY REGIME, NORTON ANNUAL SURVEY OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW (2004) [hereinafter BATRA, THE INDIAN INSOLVENCY REGIME].
81. For an excellent recent treatment of this general topic, see KENNETH W. DAM, THE
LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2006). See also
Raphael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny,
Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997), available at
http://www.edhec-mba.com/mailing/drd/flds/legaldeterminantsofexternalfinance.pdf;
Raphael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny,
Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) [hereinafter LaPorta et al., Law and
Finance],
available
at
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/files/law_finance.pdf.
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cy law 82 and related doctrines that protect, or at least clarify, lenders’
interests when their borrowers default or suffer financial distress, are
considered particularly important for promoting lending and investment
in a developing economy. But simply adopting a scheme of formal rules
is not sufficient for this purpose, and a functioning judicial or administrative system is a basic precondition for enforcement of formal rules.83
In 1993, the Indian parliament passed the Recovery of Debts Due to
Banks and Financial Institutions Act, which created a system of debt recovery tribunals. 84 Pursuant to that Act, domestic banks and non-bank
financial institutions 85 can file applications with one of the debt recovery
tribunals to recover debts greater than one million rupees (approximately

82. See generally DAM, supra note 81; LaPorta et al., Law and Finance, supra note
81. A bankruptcy regime can help lenders, especially commercial lenders, in part by solving a collective action problem. By staying a race to collect assets from a troubled debtor,
bankruptcy law can help avoid the liquidation of firms that have a relatively high goingconcern value. See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW 7-19 (Harvard University Press 1986). It can also hasten the resolution of a debtor’s
liquidation, when necessary, so that assets are not wasted by a failing enterprise. Effective protection of creditors is widely thought to be particularly important for countries
making a transition away from a planned economy. See, e.g., Alexander Biryukov,
Ukrainian Bankruptcy Law in the Context of Regional and International Developments,
13 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 13 (2007); Charles Booth, Drafting Bankruptcy Laws in
Socialist Market Economies: Recent Developments in China and Vietnam, 18 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 93 (2004) [hereinafter Booth, Drafting Bankruptcy Laws]; Rupinder Singh Suri,
The New Insolvency Regime: J.J. Irani Expert Committee Report with Special Emphasis
on
Reconstruction
&
Winding-up,
at
67
(2005),
available
at
http://www.insolindia.com/papers.htm.
83. See, e.g., Mathieu Chemin, Decoding the Code of Civil Procedure: Do Judiciaries Matter for Growth? (Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Economiques et l’Emploi, Working Paper No. 07-26, 2007), available at
http://www.cirpee.org/fileadmin/documents/Cahiers_2007/CIRPEE07-26.pdf.
84. There are twenty-nine debt-recovery tribunals and five appellate tribunals for
bank and non-bank financial institution cases across the country. INDIA COUNTRY
FINANCE 2006, supra note 1, at 12.
85. The designation of non-bank financial institutions is a bit confusing, because it
seems to be used to refer to two different categories of institutions. The first category
includes a handful of large institutions (the Financial Institutions), that provide a relatively large amount of credit to development projects across the country. These are generally
state development banks. The Reserve Bank of India has apparently been trying to merge
these institutions with existing banks. Another category includes many, much smaller,
private companies that provide a wide range of financial activities other than taking deposits. These are most often described as non-bank financial companies. Both appear to
be subject to regulation by the Reserve Board of India. The Reserve Bank of India recently required the NBFC’s to register with it.
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$22,000). 86 While these tribunals appear to represent an improvement in
the enforceability of obligations, they are still apparently quite slow and
unpredictable. 87 Responding in part to frustration with these newly
created debt recovery tribunals, the Indian parliament adopted the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Act of 2002 to enable banks and financial institutions to enforce
security interests without court intervention in some circumstances. 88
This Act applies to obligations greater than Rs.100,000 (approximately
$2,200) for which over 20% of the obligation is unpaid. 89
The Indian legislature also recently reformed the country’s laws dealing with corporate liquidations and reorganizations by amending the
country’s Companies Act and repealing the Sick Industrial Companies
Act (“SICA”). 90 The SICA had created a Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction to oversee reorganization of corporations facing financial distress. 91 Despite that earlier reform, it was recently estimated
that the average corporate insolvency process in India takes a decade.92
The new legislation, which has not yet taken effect, will replace the
Board with a National Company Law Tribunal that will have authority to
resolve both liquidations and reorganizations. 93 Indian banks and the Reserve Bank of India have also created a voluntary corporate debt restructuring scheme. 94
86. BATRA, THE INDIAN INSOLVENCY REGIME, supra note 80, pt. II. The Tribunal
adjudicates claims and then executes judgments by selling a debtor’s assets pursuant to
broad powers of attachment and injunction. Id.
87. Id.; Batra, Insolvency Laws In South Asia, supra note 80.
88. Pursuant to the Act, a secured bank or financial institution must give a defaulting
debtor sixty days to satisfy its obligation; thereafter, the lender can, among other things,
take over the asset, take over the borrower’s business, or appoint a manager for the assets.
See Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security
Act of 2002, ch. 3, § 13, available at http://www.drat.tn.nic.in/Docu/SecuritisationAct.pdf. In such a case, the debtor can appeal to a debt recovery tribunal. See Gopalakrishna & Ravi, supra note 83.
89. See Karan Singh, India: The Need for Reform, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Mar. 1, 2009,
available at http://www.iflr.com/Article/2166570/India-The-need-for-reform.html.
90. BATRA, THE INDIAN INSOLVENCY REGIME, supra note 80, pt. II; Batra, Insolvency
Laws In South Asia, supra note 80, § 1, at 4.
91. Batra, Insolvency Laws In South Asia, supra note 80, § 1, at 4. This Board effectively shares jurisdiction for corporate reorganizations with the national court. Id.
92. See Sachdev, supra note 74, at 199; Batra, Insolvency Laws In South Asia, supra
note 80, at § 3; World Bank, Doing Business in 2005, Removing Obstacles to Growth, A
Report from the World Bank, at 69 (2005) [hereinafter World Bank, Doing Business],
available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/documents/DoingBusiness2005.PDF.
93. See World Bank, Doing Business, supra note 92, at 70. The Tribunal will sit in
ten locations across the country.
94. See Singh, supra note 89.
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While these various reforms should further improve the enforceability
of obligations and thus promote lending, they have significant structural
limitations. For example, banks and financial institutions with relatively
small claims are not covered by the 1993 Recovery of Debts Act; they
must still sue in the civil courts under the Civil Code to enforce their security interests. 95 And creditors that are not banks or financial institutions
must also resort to the civil courts of more general jurisdiction.96 Although the Civil Code was amended in 2002 to improve its efficiency, 97
it appears that there is a serious backlog of cases in the civil courts, causing significant delays. 98
B. Effect of Liberalization on Consumer Finance
The broader liberalization of financial markets in India has presumably
supported the recent growth in that country’s consumer financial markets. As an initial matter, some consumer transactions in India fall within
the scope of the general reforms described above.99 In addition, policymakers in that country have adopted a variety of policies more directly
designed to expand formal consumer financial markets. Perhaps most
significantly, the Indian government recently established the nation’s

95. See BATRA, THE INDIAN INSOLVENCY REGIME, supra note 80, pt. II. These courts
have many of the same powers as the debt recovery tribunals; it appears that they have
larger caseloads than the tribunals, however, and may lack expertise in debt recovery or
enforcement.
96. See BATRA, THE INDIAN INSOLVENCY REGIME, supra note 80, pt. II.
97. See Mathieu Chemin, Does Judicial Quality Shape Economic Activity? Evidence
from a Judicial Reform in India (Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques
Economiques et l’Emploi, Working Paper No. 07-25, 2007), available at
http://www.cirpee.org/fileadmin/documents/Cahiers_2007/CIRPEE07-25.pdf.
98. Mathieu Chemin, Decoding the Code of Civil Procedure: Do Judiciaries Matter
for Growth?, 3 (Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Economiques et
l’Emploi, Working Paper No. 07-26, 2007) (“The speed of the judiciary has been identified as a key problem in India.”). See also Reserve Bank of India, Report of the Technical
Group To Review Legislation On Money Lending, at 45 (2007) [hereinafter RBI, Report
of
the
Technical
Group],
available
at
http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/PublicationReport/pdfs/78893.pdf; World Bank, Doing
Business, supra note 92, at 65.
99. Empirical data about these reforms is not available, but there are reasons to believe that they have improved the enforceability of consumer obligations. Although they
appear to have been directed at commercial lenders, both sets of reforms reach at least
some consumer transactions. The debt recovery tribunals should be available for consumer loans greater than one million rupees. Banks and financial institutions that lend to consumers can enforce their security agreements without court intervention.
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first credit bureau, the Credit Information Bureau of India (“CIBIL”). 100
After a few years of operations, CIBIL has over 144 million records. 101
Policymakers have also made various efforts to draw consumers and
households into the formal economy and away from informal, largely
unregulated sources of finance. A wide variety of “indigenous” lenders
and informal financial institutions have long played a major role in the
consumer economy. 102 There is some evidence that, compared to more
formal institutions, moneylenders are better able to serve certain borrowers and to recover obligations from these borrowers; as a result, they often have relatively lower costs of conducting business. 103 Interestingly,
moneylenders continue to thrive in India in part because they will lend
for consumption purposes when formal lenders are less willing to do
so. 104 Some policymakers continue to be concerned, however, that borrowing from moneylenders is inefficient, that many moneylenders are
unscrupulous, and that consumer lending should be conducted by entities
subject to more rigorous regulation. 105

100. INDIA COUNTRY FINANCE 2006, supra note 1, at 9. CIBIL was incorporated in
2001 and was restructured in 2005; its ownership is currently divided between the State
Bank of India, various other domestic and foreign banks, Dun & Bradstreet, and Trans
Union International. Id. As reflected by the Credit Information Companies (Regulation)
Act of 2005, India is trying to spur the development of additional credit reporting entities.
See RBI, Annual Policy Statement 2007–2008, supra note 49, at 59; INDIA COUNTRY
FINANCE 2006, supra note 1, at 9.
101. See News & Events, Updates, CIBIL, http://www.cibil.com/updates.htm (last
visited Nov. 1, 2010).
102. See INDIA COUNTRY FINANCE 2006, at 4–5.
103. See id. at 25.
104. See id. at 34.
105. See, e.g., Mihir Shah, The Crowning of the Moneylender, THE HINDU, Sept. 1,
2007, available at http://www.thehindu.com/2007/09/01/stories/2007090155971000.htm.
Unlike banks and other formal non-bank financial companies, moneylenders are generally not regulated by the Reserve Bank of India. In 2006, the Reserve Bank of India formed
a “Technical Group” to review the economic function and the regulation of this group of
lenders. See RBI, Report of the Technical Group, supra note 98, at 1. As described below, regulation of moneylending is primarily vested in the state governments. The Group
discovered significant variation in the regulations that different states have adopted, but
noted certain common regulatory approaches. These commonalities include licensing
requirements for moneylending; accounting duties to borrowers; penalities for aggressive
debt collection activities; and rate regulations. Id. at 17. Not all states impose rate ceilings, however. Id. at 19 n.46. Many moneylenders refuse to register or become licensed
and therefore are truly part of the informal economy. See id. at 35–36. The Group proposed model legislation of moneylending for state governments to consider adopting. The
model legislation includes, among other things, provisions to promote registration of
lenders; rate regulations (in the form of adjustable ceilings set by the state governments);
use of alternative dispute resolution processes (like Lok Adalat and Nyaya Panchayat) or
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As a result of this ambivalence, policymakers have adopted various
strategies toward moneylenders in recent decades, some designed to
“mainstream” moneylenders and others apparently designed to drive
them out of business. 106 A primary strategy policymakers have employed
to remove moneylenders from the market is to promote and subsidize
more formal credit services to low-income households. Thus, for example, the Indian government has subsidized commercial banks to enable
some institutions lending to rural households to offer credit at a relatively
low rate of interest. 107 Another example of this effort is the introduction
of Kisan credit cards by state-controlled banks. These cards enable farmers to borrow for production on relatively generous terms. 108
Policymakers have also promoted the development and formalization
of microfinance institutions 109 to draw consumers away from money“fast-track” judicial procedures; and promotion of links between moneylenders and banks
(by creating a category of “accredited loan providers”). Id. at 41–57. Some commentators
argue that policy-makers should promote links between moneylenders and the formal
banking sector by encouraging banks to finance the lenders or use them as “loan providers.” Id. at 25–29 (discussing, among others, R. Vaidyanathan, Why the Financial System
Must Legitimise Moneylenders, THE HINDU, Oct. 19, 2006, available at
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2006/10/19/stories/2006101900041000.htm).
These proposals lean in the direction of drawing moneylenders into the formal financial
sector, i.e., into the mainstream. See Shah, supra note 105 (criticizing the Group’s report).
106. See RBI, Report of the Technical Group, supra note 98, at 4 (quoting Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India, Address at the Second Agricultural Summit (Oct.
18, 2006)).
107. Id. at 9 (quoting Dr. Y.V. Reddy, Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, Lecture
at the Center for Economic and Social Studies, Ameerpet, Hyderbad (Dec. 16, 2006)).
108. Id. at 8.
109. This Article distinguishes microfinance from formal consumer finance, which is
generally provided to individuals who are already earning some income and/or already
have some assets to pledge as security. This distinction is admittedly somewhat arbitrary
and imperfect, and it is made here to delineate a particularly important phenomenon: the
emergence of formal consumer financial markets in India and elsewhere. To be clear,
however, most microfinance institutions are formal legal entities. Some in India are quite
large; some of the largest are non-bank financial companies subject to regulation by the
Reserve Bank of India while smaller microfinance institutions may be organized as trusts
or cooperative societies. See RBI, Report of the Technical Group, supra note 98, at 9.
Because of India’s controls on ownership and investment in the financial sector, see supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text, and because non-banks are not allowed to mobilize deposits, most Indian microfinance institutions are funded by loans from larger
commercial banks or from development banks. See Microfinance Information Exchange,
Benchmarking Asian Microfinance 2005, at 6 (Nov. 2006), available at
http://www.themix.org/sites/default/files/MIX_2005_Asia_Benchmarking_Report_EN.p
df. “[I]ndian microfinance providers [are] some of the most highly leveraged institutions
globally.” Id. at 4. The National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development is an im-
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lenders. The government has sought to bring these institutions within the
banking sector by linking them to formal institutions. 110 The Reserve
Bank of India, for example, increasingly encouraged banks and non-bank
financial institutions to link with microfinance institutions and self-help
groups to promote “financial inclusion.”111 Information about the actual
scale and scope of microfinance in the country is incomplete at best.112
Many of these institutions do not reliably report their activities.113 According to one estimate, there were approximately 150,000 active borrowers in 2006, with nearly 110% growth in borrowers over the previous
year. 114
Although they still represent a relatively small portion of the consumer
credit market, there is evidence that where microfinance institutions operate, the relative amount of moneylending has dropped, though rates
have not. 115 This suggests that these entities may be acquiring some of
the clients of moneylenders. If microfinance institutions are, in turn,
linked with banks, their expansion represents a gain for the formal financial sector, one that banks might not be able to obtain through branch-

portant entity in the microfinance sector. It was created by the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development Act of 1981 to be a leading development bank. It serves as a
financial resource and supervisory body for other public and private rural financial institutions, including many microfinance institutions, self-help groups, and nongovernmental organizations that provide small-scale development financing. See About
BANK
FOR
AGRIC.
&
RURAL
DEV.
(2007),
NABARD,
NAT’L
http://www.nabard.org/majoractivities.asp.
110. See RBI, Report of the Technical Group, supra note 98, at 9.
111. See RBI, Annual Policy Statement 2007-2008, supra note 49, at 55 (citing a study
of microfinance). See also Mohan, supra note 40, at 15 (noting that microfinance can
help expand rural credit). See also Smt. Usha Thorat, Speech at Pune, Financial Inclusion
and
Millennium
Development
Goals,
(Jan.
2006),
available
at
http://www.bis.org/review/r060126f.pdf (noting the growth of NGO’s, SHG’s and MFI’s
and their increased links with banks). Historically, a predominant proportion of consumers of microfinance have been women in rural areas.
112. See Microfinance Information Exchange, Transparency and Performance in Indian Microfinance, at 1 (2006) [hereinafter Transparency and Performance in Indian
Microfinance],
available
at
http://www.themix.org/sites/default/files/2005%20India%20Microfinance%20Performan
ce%20and%20Transparency%20Report%20-%20English.pdf.
113. Thus, for example, a leading clearinghouse of information about microfinance in
India disqualified survey responses by nearly 25% of respondent institutions to its 2004–
05 survey. See Transparency and Performance in Indian Microfinance, supra note 112.
114. See id.
115. RBI, Report of the Technical Group, supra note 98, at 38. Interest rates charged
to borrowers from self-help groups range from 18–24%; borrowers from microfinance
institutions tend to pay 20–24%. Id. at 10.
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ing. 116 Furthermore, it appears that major Indian microfinance institutions are sustainable—approximately 80% of microfinance borrowers in
the country are borrowing from arguably sustainable institutions.117
C. Liberalization and Consumer Protection
If deepening of consumer financial markets can promote growth and
development, there are also various costs associated with consumer credit—especially costs of over-indebtedness—that can undermine the benefits of expanding access to credit. 118 As consumer financial markets
continue to expand in India, such costs will likely become a more significant concern for policy-makers in that country. There is likely to be a
significant amount of class mobility out of poverty in that country in
coming years. 119 If so, India’s consumer borrowers will increasingly be
drawn from populations that had previously been quite poor and unaccustomed to consumer finance and discretionary consumption. These
individuals may be particularly susceptible to taking on relatively high
levels of debt. In fact, although relevant data is scarce, default rates in the
country have increased in recent years.120 Additionally, there appears to
be a significant psychological dimension to financial distress in India, as
elsewhere. 121 Most dramatically, many thousands of heavily indebted
farmers, especially in the Indian states of Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra,
Karnataka, and Kerala, have committed suicide in recent years.122 Farmer
suicides are not a new phenomenon in India, but they may reflect a general stigma associated with debt and default in India. Debt bondage 123
116. V. Leeladhar, Taking Banking Services to the Common Man—Financial Inclusion,
RBI
Bulletin,
(Jan.
2006),
available
at
http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Bulletin/PDFs/68236.pdf. The country’s branching policy
is designed to get more services to rural areas. See RBI, Annual Policy Statement 2007–
2008, supra note 49, at 51–52.
117. See RBI, Annual Policy Statement 2007–2008, supra note 49, at 6.
118. See Feibelman, supra note 8, at 79–81.
119. See Ablett et al., supra note 43.
120. See RBI, Annual Policy Statement 2007–2008, supra note 49, at 26.
121. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, On India’s Despairing Farms, a Plague of Suicide,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at A1 (noting that over 17,000 farmers committed suicide in
2003, the most recent official comprehensive statistic available). These farmers had borrowed to finance small-scale farming operations; slumping prices or unexpected crop
losses had left them heavily, hopelessly indebted. See also Ablett et al., supra note 43, at
88.
123. See, e.g., KEVIN BALES, DISPOSABLE PEOPLE: NEW SLAVERY IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 19–20 (University of California Press 1999); Karen E. Bravo, Exploring the
Analogy Between Modern Trafficking in Humans and the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 25
B.U. INT’L L.J. 207, 275 n.304 (2007).
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and imprisonment for debt 124 also appear to be continuing phenomena in
India. 125 At the very least, these continuing phenomena—debt-related
suicide, bondage, and imprisonment—indicate the need for serious regulatory attention to the social and economic consequences of consumer
indebtedness in India.
Although policymakers in India appear to have begun to address some
of the consequences of increased consumer indebtedness, the regulatory
framework remains much the same as it was before the current era of
liberalization. This is especially true at the national level. There is a national usury act in India, the Usurious Loans Act of 1918 (“ULA”),
which empowers courts to determine whether an interest rate is excessive
“having regard to the risk incurred as it appeared . . . to the creditor at the
date of the loan.” 126 As discussed below, many Indian states have
adopted rate regulations as well.127 These rate ceilings, in turn, provide a
benchmark for claims of excessive interest rates under the ULA. 128 But,
as with the difficulties creditors face in enforcing obligations, debtors
may face hurdles in asserting rights under the ULA or under state law,
which must be done in the civil courts.129
Under the Banking Regulation Act of 1949, banks and some other financial institutions are exempt from the ULA and are subject instead to
any rate regulations imposed by the Reserve Bank of India. 130 Although
the Reserve Bank no longer sets rate ceilings, 131 it has explicitly stated

124. In 1980, the Supreme Court of India found that imprisonment for debt was unconstitutional. See Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 470, 475.
But this case only extends to cases in which a debtor acts innocently. Thus, if a debtor is
found to act in bad faith with respect to a financial obligation, he or she may still be subject to imprisonment.
125. Statistical information on debt bondage and imprisonment for debt are scarce, and
it is difficult to determine whether they have been significantly affected—either positively or negatively—by expanding formal markets for consumer finance or regulation thereof. Both are largely rural phenomena, so it is possible that they have not significantly
increased as overall household indebtedness has grown. It is also possible that regulatory
concerns about over-indebtedness have drawn attention to the underlying factors of debtrelated suicides and bondage, leading to reductions in severity of both.
126. Usurious Loans Act, No. 10 of 1918, § 3(2), INDIA CODE, available at
http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=191810. The act gives state governments the
power to exempt classes of transactions from the act. RBI, Report of the Technical
Group, supra note 98, at 23.
127. See infra notes 135–39 and accompanying text.
128. RBI, Report of the Technical Group, supra note 98, at 19.
129. See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
130. RBI, Report of the Technical Group, supra note 98, at 23.
131. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.

100

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 36:1

that rates can still be usurious or imprudent.132 And the Reserve Bank has
recently issued statements expressing concern that some lenders are
charging rates that are too high. 133 This may suggest that there is serious
potential for re-regulation of rates for at least some Indian financial institutions. In addition, the Bank recently has issued guidelines for credit
card lenders that regulate the process by which credit card lenders set
their interest rates. 134
In addition to this federal regulation, many states have adopted specific
interest rate ceilings for moneylenders pursuant to their constitutional
authority. 135 At least five states effectively impose the Hindu rule of
“damdupat,” which provides that “the amount of interest recoverable at
any one time cannot exceed the principal.” 136 Furthermore, states have
adopted broader regulatory schemes affecting particular types of transactions. For example, Tamil Nadu (which includes Chennai, formerly Madras) has adopted a specific regime covering pawnbrokers 137 and one
regulating moneylenders that are not within the jurisdiction of the Reserve Bank. 138 That state also recently adopted laws that made it a crime
132. RBI, Annual Policy Statement 2007–2008, supra note 49, at 56.
133. See Reserve Bank of India, Complaints about Excessive Interest Charged by
Banks,
RBI
Notification
(2007),
available
at
http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/77163.pdf; Reserve Bank of India, Annual Policy Statement 2007-2008, supra note 49, at 56; Reserve Bank of India, Report of
the Working Group to Formulate a Scheme for Ensuring Reasonableness of Bank
Charges, at 18 (Sept. 2006) [hereinafter RBI, Report of the Working Group], available at
http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publication Report/Pdfs/72575.pdf (noting that RBI has
received complaints of high interest charges).
134. Among other things, the new guidelines require banks to adopt rate ceilings. See
Reserve Bank of India, Credit Card Operations of Banks, RBI Notification (2010) [hereinafter
RBI,
Credit
Card
Operations
of
Banks],
available
at
http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/CCOB090710.pdf.
135. The Constitution of India explicitly grants authority for regulating moneylending
to the country’s state governments, most of which have adopted specific regulations.
RBI, Report of the Technical Group, supra note 98, at 16.
136. Id. at 23.
137. Tamil Nadu Pawnbrokers Act, 1943, Tamil Nadu Act 23 of 1943. This Act requires, among other things, that pawnbrokers in the state be licensed, id. § 3; keep books
and give receipts, id. § 10; and provide pawn tickets to pawners, id. § 7. It also set limits
on the interest and fees that they can charge. Id. § 6. See also Tamil Nadu Pawnbrokers
Rules, 1943, § 5.
138. Tamil Nadu Money-Lenders Act, 1957, Act No. 26 of 1957. Among other things,
this Act creates a licensing scheme, id. § 4; requires that money-lenders keep books and
records, id. § 9; authorizes the appointment of inspectors, id. § 10; and regulates rates that
money-lenders can charge, id. § 7. The State of Tamil Nadu subsequently extended those
regulations with the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2003,
Act No. 38 of 2003. That Act applies to all persons. Under the Money-Lenders Act, a
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for managers of a financial institution not regulated by the Reserve Bank
of India to fail to return deposits to depositors.139
Until recently, there have been few mandatory disclosure regimes under Indian law. The country has not adopted anything like the Truth In
Lending Act, which applies to consumer credit transactions in the United
States. 140 In 1986, India did adopt the Consumer Protection Act. The Act
does not impose disclosure requirements, but prohibits various types of
misrepresentations. 141 More recently, however, Indian policymakers have
become more attentive to the benefits of disclosure, and they apparently
believe that some disclosures must be mandated. The Reserve Bank of
India has required the banking industry to adopt and promulgate a code
of fair lending for banks and other financial institutions. 142 The code requires the institutions to disclose the terms of their various services.143
The Bank has also issued guidelines for credit card lenders that include
some disclosure requirements, including a requirement that banks dismoneylender is defined as “a person whose main or subsidiary occupation is the business
of advancing and realizing loans.” Tamil Nadu Money-Lenders Act § 2(8).
139. See Tamil Nadu Protection of Interests of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1997, Act No. 44 of 1997. Indicating the growing need for regulation of consumer financial transactions, the Act’s introductory statement recites:
There is a mushroom growth of Financial Establishments not covered by the
Reserve Bank of India Act . . . in the State in the recent past with the sole
object of grabbing money received as deposits from the public, mostly middle class and poor, on the promise of unprecedented high rates of interest
and without any obligation to refund the deposits to the investors on maturity. Many of the Financial Establishments have defaulted to return the deposits on maturity to the public running to crores of rupees and there by inviting public resentment, which created law and order problems in the state.
Id.
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (2006).
141. See generally V.K. AGARWAL, LAW OF CONSUMER PROTECTION (2009). The Act
also creates liability for deficiency in consumer goods and services, including financial
services. See id. at 80–83, 104–05. Thus, deficiency in banking service—e.g., violating a
banking regulation or a contractual obligations—can trigger liability under the Act,
though the Reserve Bank can presumably override that by providing that a particular
action does not violate a bank’s obligations. GURJEET SINGH, THE LAW OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION IN INDIA 112–13 (1996).
142. This arrangement is arguably an example of industry self-regulation, which became increasingly popular in Indian law in the late 1980’s. See SINGH, supra note 141, at
308–13.
143. See, e.g., Reserve Bank of India, Guidelines on Fair Practices Code for Lenders,
RBI Notification (2003) [hereinafter RBI, Guidelines on Fair Practices Code for Lenders], available at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/36102.pdf; Reserve
Bank of India, Guidelines on Fair Practices Code for Non-Banking Financial Companies,
RBI
Notification
(2006),
available
at
http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Notification/PDFs/73029.pdf.

102

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 36:1

close the annual percentage rate on credit card facilities.144 It is worth
noting, however, that written disclosures face additional limitations
where a significant number of potential consumers cannot read. The
adult literacy rate in India was 64% in 2004. 145
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that policymakers in India have made
attempts to improve financial education for consumers. Although scholars and commentators increasingly question the effectiveness and the
benefits of financial education in general,146 it is possible that such efforts can be especially valuable in a developing economy like India’s. If
significant numbers of Indians will move from poverty into the lowermiddle or middle-class in coming years, increased financial education
may prove beneficial. In any event, the Reserve Bank of India appears to
be strongly interested in promoting financial education. In particular, the
Bank has explicitly adopted a policy in favor of expanding credit counseling. 147 More generally, financial education is an important component
of the Bank’s policies aimed at financial inclusion, as noted above, 148
especially its efforts to encourage relationships between banks, microfinance institutions, and non-governmental organizations. 149 At this point,
however, it appears that the scale of financial education and financial
literacy initiatives in India is still very modest. 150 While increased financial education seems to pose few risks, the potential benefits may ultimately be limited. To be effective on any meaningful scale in India, it
would need to be a rather massive, and potentially costly, program.

144. See RBI, Credit Card Operations of Banks, supra note 134.
145. See NSSO, Status of Education and Vocational Training in India 2004–05, Report No. 517, at i (Dec. 2006).
146. See, e.g., Lauren Willis, Against Financial Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV.
197 (2008); Karen Gross, Financial Literacy Education: Panacea, Palliative, or Something Worse?, 24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 307 (2005); Karen Gross & Susan BlockLieb, Empty Mandate or Opportunity for Innovation? Pre-petition Credit Counseling and
Post-petition Financial Management Education, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 549
(2005); A. Michele Dickerson, Can Shame, Guilt, or Stigma Be Taught? Why Credit
Focused Debtor Education May Not Work, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 945 (1999).
147. See RBI, Annual Policy Statement 2007–2008, supra note 49, at 54–55; RBI,
Report of the Working Group, supra note 133, at 44–45. See also Mohan, supra note 40,
at 17.
148. See supra notes 102–17 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Reserve Bank of India, Financial Literacy and Credit Counselling Centres
(2008),
available
at
http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationDraftReports.aspx?ID=526.
150. See id.; Dr. Y.V. Reddy, Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, Lecture at the
Center for Economic and Social Studies, Ameerpet, Hyderbad (Dec. 16, 2006), available
at http://www.bis.org/review/r060921b.pdf.
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Given the limitations of policies aimed at the transactional stage of
consumer finance, policies that regulate the subsequent relationships between debtors and creditors—regulation of debt-collection and debtrelief—arguably take on more importance. Indian policymakers have
adopted some regulation of debt-collection outside of the bankruptcy
context. For example, many Indian states apparently recognize the crime
of molestation, which includes aggressive acts in the collection of
debt. 151 The Tamil Nadu Moneylenders Act, noted above, also provides:
“Whoever molests or abets the molestation of any debtor for the recovery
of any loan shall be punished with imprisonment” and, if the court
chooses, with a fine as well. 152 It is noteworthy that this provision is not
limited to moneylenders. The Reserve Bank of India has also begun to
exert some pressure on banks to avoid overly-aggressive collection activities. The fair practices code for lenders, noted above, 153 includes this
provision: “In the matter of recovery of loans, the lenders should not
resort to undue harassment viz. persistently bothering the borrowers at
odd hours, use of muscle power for recovery of loans, etc.” 154 Similarly,
the Bank’s guidelines for credit card lenders prohibit overly aggressive
debt collection tactics.155 Finally, as the Kaur opinions indicate,156 courts
in India may be increasingly inclined to find a basis for policing debt
collectors who engage in egregious behavior.
It also appears that there are some limited forms of non-bankruptcy
debt relief available in India. For example, the Federal Code of Civil
Procedure provides that some forms of property are exempt from creditors’ enforcement of obligations. 157 Perhaps more significant, the Reserve Bank of India recently instituted a settlement program for small
non-performing loans; 158 this is a form of debt-relief, and the stated goal

151. See Tamil Nadu Money-Lenders Act, 1957.
152. See id. § 13. This section was added by amendment in 1979. See Tamil Nadu
Money-Lenders (Amendment) Act, Act 41, 1979, § 9.
153. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
154. RBI, Guidelines on Fair Practices Code for Lenders, supra note 143, at (V)(c). It
is not clear, however, whether the Reserve Bank has taken any regulatory action against
any institution for violating this provision of the code.
155. See Reserve Bank of India, Credit Card Operations of Banks, supra note 134.
156. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
157. See INDIA CODE CIV. PROC., No. 5 of 1908; INDIA CODE (1986) 18, 19. These
exemptions are incorporated and expanded under India’s insolvency laws. See infra note
197 and accompanying text.
158. See Reserve Bank of India, One-Time Settlement Scheme for Small Borrowal
Accounts and Eligibility for Fresh Loans, RBI Notification (2005), available at
http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/67937.pdf. See also Reserve Bank of
India, Guidelines for Compromise Settlement of Chronic Non-Performing Assets (NPAs)
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of the program is to make consumers eligible for fresh finance. The program applies to loans under Rs. 25,000 (approximately $625) and does
not “cover cases of fraud or malfeasance.” 159 In addition to these measures, it appears that Indian states have occasionally enacted temporary
debt-relief measures in times of general financial and economic stress.160
D. Summary
In sum, the market for consumer finance in India has been expanding
dramatically over the last twenty years. This growth in consumer lending
appears to have been spurred, at least in part, by reforms that have liberalized the country’s financial sector. More importantly, there are good
reasons to believe that this consumer lending has contributed to the country’s economic growth and development. Yet various costs associated
with consumer lending probably serve as a drag on these beneficial effects and may even outweigh them. If so, they should be constrained.
Consumer lending will likely continue to expand in India, even without
additional reforms to further liberalize the financial sector. But moderating the negative effects of consumer lending will likely require more affirmative efforts. For a country in India’s position—perhaps facing a
dramatic surge in domestic consumption and consumer borrowing—it
would be encouraging to see an emerging regulatory commitment to aggressively addressing the potential costs of consumer finance, especially
over-indebtedness. Doing so may dampen the expansion of consumer
credit to some extent, but it would likely help ensure that any further expansion would be more efficient and productive.
III. THE ROLE FOR CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW
As noted above, there are good reasons to believe that an effective
consumer bankruptcy or insolvency161 regime can promote the efficient
deepening of consumer financial markets in emerging economies like
India. 162 This Part notes some of the potential benefits of a consumer
of
Public
Sector
Banks,
RBI
Notification
(2003),
available
at
http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/34117.pdf.
159. See Reserve Bank of India, One-Time Settlement Scheme for Small Borrowal
Accounts, supra note 158.
160. See, e.g., Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act, 1972; Tamil Nadu Indebted Agriculturalists (Temporary Relief) Act, 1976; Tamil Nadu Indebted Persons (Temporary Relief)
Act, 1976; Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act, 1976, No. 31, President’s Acts, 1976; Tamil
Nadu Debt Relief Act, 1978.
161. On the interchangeability of the terms bankruptcy and insolvency, see supra note
12.
162. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
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bankruptcy or insolvency law. It then describes India’s insolvency regime as it applies to consumers, noting some of the formal and practical
limitations of the current regime and proposing that, with even modest
reforms, it might contribute more meaningfully to efficient expansion of
consumer financial markets in India.
A. Bankruptcy Basics
While there is much variation in bankruptcy laws around the globe,
there are some basic components of these regimes that arguably define
the category. Most fundamentally, bankruptcy regimes provide a mechanism by which an insolvent debtor, or one experiencing some form of
financial distress, can stay the collection efforts of its creditors and seek
an orderly resolution or restructuring of its obligations. In the absence of
an effective bankruptcy mechanism, creditors may face a collective action problem and race to collect from a struggling debtor, making insolvency returns unpredictable and, in some circumstances, reducing the
creditors’ overall recovery. 163 Bankruptcy law can also provide a timely
resolution of claims and disputes to reduce the erstwhile wasting of assets. In theory, these aspects of bankruptcy law provide an ex ante benefit to borrowers by reducing the cost of credit.
The functions of bankruptcy law are somewhat different in the consumer and corporate context. Generally, consumer bankruptcy serves to
stay collection of an individual’s obligations and then provide for a
scheme of repayment and/or discharge of obligations. As with corporate
bankruptcy, consumer bankruptcy ideally increases the insolvency-state
return of creditors by enforcing security arrangements, providing for the
orderly distribution of available assets to unsecured creditors, and by enforcing other inter-creditor obligations. 164 Unlike business associations,
consumers obviously cannot be liquidated.165 Thus, in addition to improving creditors’ insolvency returns, a primary goal of consumer bankruptcy law is to enable debtors to return to productivity and to reduce
various collateral costs of the debtor’s insolvency. The availability of
debt-relief in bankruptcy, which varies significantly across jurisdic-

163. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
164. Thus, while such a regime may seem as if it is simply designed to protect insolvent consumers, it offers considerable potential benefits to creditors as well. In fact, consumer bankruptcy was historically understood to be a tool for creditors of insolvent consumer debtors. See, e.g., BRUCE MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE
OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 78 (2002).
165. A primary function of corporate bankruptcy law is to provide a procedural mechanism for choosing between liquidation and restructuring insolvent corporate debtors.
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tions, 166 is generally the most important tool for reducing the social costs
of consumer finance. By providing a meaningful opportunity for debtrelief, a bankruptcy regime can effectively insure debtors against some of
the effects of financial distress or insolvency. 167 Borrowers presumably
pay for this insurance in the form of higher interest rates, though it may
also reduce the availability of credit to some borrowers. In addition to
providing debtors with a “fresh start,” and supporting the smoothing
function of credit, this insurance may also make individuals more inclined to borrow for productive purposes in the first place. For entrepreneurs, the availability of debt relief in bankruptcy can serve as a form of
business-failure insurance.168
The staying of creditors’ collection efforts under bankruptcy law can
also reduce various costs of individuals’ financial distress. Most important, it gives debtors a tool to escape, at least momentarily, 169 from collection efforts by their creditors. The benefit of the stay derives both
from the fact that debtors can actually employ it by filing for bankruptcy
and from the fact that they know they can do so if necessary. If consumers are susceptible to psychological stress caused by indebtedness and
collection efforts, the ability to stay collection may save costs associated
with such stress. Reducing some of the psychological and emotional burdens associated with financial distress may, in turn, make it easier for
debtors return to productivity.
B. Consumer Insolvency in India
1. The Formal Scheme. India’s insolvency regime is approximately
100 years old, though it has even older antecedents. 170 Although India
modernized the framework for liquidating and reorganizing companies in
recent years, 171 the country’s consumer insolvency regime has not been
166. See generally Rafael Efrat, Global Trends in Personal Bankruptcy, 76 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 81 (2002).
167. To the extent that the right to discharge is mandatory, it effectively forces borrowers to insure against default, making it a form of social insurance. The increased cost
of credit and potential rationing may push some high risk borrowers to illegal sources or
to costly secured lending (or equivalents like pawnbrokers).
168. See, e.g., John Armour & Douglas Cumming, Bankruptcy Law and Entrepreneurshipm, at 2–6 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 105/2008, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=762144.
169. To be clear, however, any stay will presumably enable secured creditors to enforce their security without significant delay or have the right to compensation or protection for the delay. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(d)(1) (2006).
170. See NEERA BHARIHOKE & SUDHIR TALWAR, LAW OF INSOLVENCY 2 (DELHI LAW
HOUSE, 2007); AVTAR SINGH, LAW OF INSOLVENCY (4th ed. 2004).
171. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.

2010] CONSUMER FINANCE AND INSOLVENCY LAW IN INDIA 107
meaningfully altered since it was adopted at the beginning of the last
century. 172 The formal sources of this regime are two laws adopted in the
early twentieth century—the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act and the
Provincial Insolvency Act. 173 The Presidency Towns Insolvency Act applies in what were formerly the Presidency Towns under the British
Raj—Mumbai (formerly Bombay), Chennai (formerly Madras), and
Kolkata (formerly Calcutta). 174 The Provincial Insolvency Act applies in
most of the rest of the country. 175 For the most part, the basic substantive
provisions of the acts are similar. For example, under both acts, an individual must be determined to be insolvent before the other substantive
provisions of the acts apply. 176 To be deemed an insolvent, one must be a
“debtor,” a category that includes judgment debtors.177 The insolvency
acts apply to both individual (i.e., consumer) and commercial debtors,
but corporate debtors cannot be subject to involuntary petitions.178
Both acts provide that creditors as well as debtors can petition to have
a consumer debtor deemed an insolvent if a debtor owes at least 500 Rupees (approximately $11) and commits “an act of insolvency.” 179 Acts of
172. This is not an uncommon pattern for emerging economies. China and Vietnam,
for example, recently overhauled their corporate bankruptcy regimes but decided against
reforming their consumer bankruptcy systems. Booth, Drafting Bankruptcy Laws, supra
note 82, at 111–16. This is probably a reflection of the fact that it is more important to
develop commercial lending. But circumstances will probably make it necessary to address consumer bankruptcy law in these countries as well as in India. Until recently, China and Vietnam did not have much consumer finance, but today there is an emerging
middle class in both countries. Id. at 115.
173. See BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 1. See also S.K. AIYAR, LAW OF
PROVINCIAL INSOLVENCY (1988). For the acts themselves, see INDIA CODE,
http://indiacode.nic.in/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
174. See BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 2.
175. See id. at 2.
176. See id. at 4.
177. See id. at 4–5.
178. See id. at 36–37 (discussing Provincial Insolvency Act § 79(2)(c), No. 5 of 1920,
INDIA CODE (1920), vol. 5, available at http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=192005;
Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act § 99, No. 3 of 1909, INDIA CODE (1920), vol. 5, available at http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=190903). See also In re Sulthan Pillai v.
Municipal Commissioner, A.I.R. 2002 Ker. 230; Garre Venkata Lakshminarayana v.
Medarametla Sarada and Ors., A.I.R. 2007 A.P. 54 (concerning a debtor who incurred
business-related debts). Partners and partnerships cannot be subject to insolvency petitions unless, apparently, all of the partners or the firm have committed an act of insolvency. See BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 37–39. See also Firm Mukandlal
Veerkumer v. Purushottam Singh, (1968) 2 S.C.R. 862.
179. See BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 5; Provincial Insolvency Act § 7;
Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act § 12. A debtor filing voluntarily must have at least 500
rupees (slightly more than $10) in debts or have been imprisoned in order to execute a
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insolvency include transferring all or most of one’s assets, taking action
to “defeat or delay” one’s creditors, filing a petition of insolvency, giving
creditors notice that one is not going to pay an obligation, having property sold in execution of a court decree, or failing to respond to a creditor’s
notice of insolvency. 180 A petition cannot be withdrawn without permission of the court, 181 and the court has authority to dismiss petitions filed
by debtors or creditors that do not conform to the statutory requirements. 182 Before being adjudged an insolvent, the debtor must provide
the court with a full account of the debtor’s property, assets, and obligations. 183 The court is generally required to dismiss the petition if it determines that the debtor has the ability to pay his or her obligations.184 It
will also dismiss a petition if it finds that a creditor filed the petition to
harass or intimidate the debtor.185
Once a debtor is adjudged to be an insolvent, he or she effectively
ceases to have competency to conduct his or her financial affairs, among
other disabilities. 186 A determination that a debtor is an insolvent can be
annulled. 187 An annulment may benefit the debtor by removing some of
the disabilities of being an insolvent. It may also benefit one or more of

court decree. See BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 6; Dhirendra Bhanu Sanghvi
v. ICDS Ltd., 2003 C.R. 5 (Bom.) 161 (holding that an arbitral award is a decree that can
be the basis for a creditor’s insolvency petition); Kishor K. Mehta v. HDFC Bank Ltd.,
2008 MhLj 1 (Bom.) 451; In re Siddharth Srivastava, A.I.R. 2002 (Bom.) 494 (finding
that a contempt order is not an order for purpose of Section 9).
180. See Provincial Insolvency Act § 6; Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act § 9. See
also BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 5. Both insolvency acts employ the “relation back” doctrine, which provides that the effective date of insolvency is the date of the
debtor’s act of insolvency. Id. at 75–76. A creditor must file such a petition within three
months of a debtor’s act of insolvency. Id. at 6.
181. See BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 7; Presidency-Towns Insolvency
Act § 15; Provincial Insolvency Act § 14.
182. See BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 9–10; Provincial Insolvency Act
§§ 22, 25; Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act §§ 13(8), 15(2).
183. See BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 53; Presidency-Towns Insolvency
Act § 15; Provincial Insolvency Act § 22.
184. See BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 49–50.
185. Seeid. at 57–58. The debtor can be awarded compensation from the creditor in
such a circumstance. See id. at 58.
186. See Provincial Insolvency Act § 73; Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act § 103(A).
187. See BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 110–17; Venkatachalam Chetty v.
K. Poova Gounder and Ors., 2000 (2) C.T.C. 288 (Mad.) (annulling an adjudication of
insolvency).
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the debtor’s creditors by removing obstacles to enforcing the debtor’s
obligations. 188
Indian insolvency laws allow courts to stay other related proceedings
affecting an insolvent’s property and efforts to collect obligations of the
insolvent. But the stay is not automatic upon filing of a petition.189 Under
both acts, suits affecting the property of the insolvent are generally subject to stay only after the debtor has been adjudged an insolvent, though
courts can authorize such suits thereafter. 190 Courts also have authority to
protect the insolvent from imprisonment for obligations within its jurisdiction.191 Once a petition is filed, however, courts do appear to have
some discretion to enjoin efforts to move against a debtor or the debtor’s
property, to appoint an interim receiver for the debtor’s property, and to
order that the debtor be released from imprisonment. 192
The Presidency Towns Act provides that the presiding court must hold
a public examination of the insolvent debtor that “the insolvent shall attend thereat, and shall be examined as to his conduct, dealings and property.” 193 Such an examination is not required under the Provincial Insolvency Act. 194 Under both acts, creditors submit claims against the debtor, 195 and the presiding court is given broad authority to determine the
assets of the debtor that are available to creditors.196 The insolvency acts
provide, however, that some property is exempt from recovery by creditors. 197

188. See BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 111–14. Upon annulment, however, a court may provide that the debtor’s property does not revert to the debtor. See id. at
114.
189. See, e.g., Sudhandiran v. S. Krishnan, A.I.R. 2006 (Mad.) 10 (holding that filing
an insolvency petition does not stay enforcement of an execution order “in the absence of
an order or adjudication by said [insolvency] court”).
190. See BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 12; Provincial Insolvency Act §
28; Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act § 18. These provisions apparently do not apply to
proceedings that were already pending. See BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at
60; In re Official Receiver, Jhansi v. Jugal Kishor Lachhi Ram Jaina, Hyderabad and
Ors., A.I.R. 1963 All. 459.
191. See BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 12.
192. See id at 9, 58. The court can subsequently rescind such an order and order imprisonment, however. See id. at 59.
193. Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act § 27.
194. See BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 64.
195. See Provincial Insolvency Act §§ 33, 34; Presidency Towns Insolvency Act § 46.
196. See Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act §§ 26, 36.
197. For the most part, these exemptions incorporate those under the Code of Civil
Procedure. See BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 81, 86–87. See also Provincial
Insolvency Act § 28(5); Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act § 52(1). Both Acts incorporate the general exemptions of Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. See
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If a debtor is adjudged to be an insolvent, his or her unsecured property
vests in the court or an official receiver/assignee.198 Similar to other
bankruptcy regimes, the receiver/assignee often plays an extremely important role in the Indian regime. 199 To protect creditors, a court can issue orders requiring security from an insolvent debtor or attaching the
debtor’s property. 200 In general, secured creditor’s rights are unaffected
by a debtor’s being adjudged an insolvent. 201 The debtor is given the opportunity to make a proposal of composition to his or her creditors; 202 if
accepted by the creditors, the debtor’s proposal must be approved by the
court or by the receiver.203 Priority is given to government claims, certain
administrative costs, and obligations owed to landlords. 204 The insolvency acts provide for avoidance of fraudulent transfers and preferential
payments. 205
India’s insolvency laws also provide for discharge of debts under some
circumstances. Where the debtor’s assets cannot satisfy his or her obligations, the debtor can apply for a discharge of the remaining obligations. 206 Discharge is not available under various circumstances.207 Some
BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 91. For a discussion of the Code of Civil Procedure exemptions, see supra note 157.
198. See BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 11, 81. This includes most afteracquired property. See id. at 84–86.
199. See id. at 68–70, 72–75, 98–99. For an extended discussion of the importance of
the official receiver in the Indian insolvency regime, see Mohammed Abbas Ali v. Masood Bin Mohammed Al-Khaili and Anr., 2007 A.L.D. 1 (A.P.) 60.
200. See BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 70–71.
201. See id. at 91–93; Padala Bulli Bhami Reddy v. Sura Nagabhushan Rao and Anr.,
2006 A.L.D. 4 (A.P.) 30 (holding that attachment before judgment does not establish
plaintiff as a secured creditor); Gannamanthi Pedda Subbaiah v. Chittepu Narayana Reddy, A.I.R. 2006 (A.P.) 89 (holding that a secured creditor did not need to give notice to
official receiver before executing order).
202. See Provincial Insolvency Act § 38; Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act § 28.
203. Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act § 29.
204. Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act § 49.
205. Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act §§ 55, 56; Provincial Insolvency Act §§ 53,
54. See also BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 121–24 (preferences), 23, 124–29
(fraudulent transfers); Pinnamshetty Kavitha v. Gajelli Gangadhar, A.I.R. 2007 (A.P.)
239 (fraudulent transfers). Fraudulent transfers are also voidable under the Transfer of
Property Act. See BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 23; Transfer of Property
Act, § 54, No. 4 of 1882, INDIA CODE (1920), vol. 6, available at
http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=188204.
206. See Provincial Insolvency Act § 41; Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act § 38.
The application shall be heard in open Court. (2) On the hearing of the
application, the Court shall take into consideration any report of the official assignee as to the insolvent’s conduct and affairs, and, subject to the
provisions of section 39, may (a) grant or refuse an absolute order of dis-
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of these circumstances are relatively objective, including cases in which
a debtor previously received a discharge. But others involve considerable
judgment. For example, a debtor will not receive a discharge if the presiding court determines that the debtor “has brought on or contributed to
his insolvency by rash or hazardous speculations or by unjustifiable
extravagance in living or by gambling, or by culpable neglect of his
business affairs.” 208 Furthermore, there are a variety of nondischargeable obligations, including debts to the government, debts incurred through fraud, or debts arising from criminal penalties.209 The
presiding court generally holds a hearing on the question of discharge. 210
The terms of discharge are subject to considerable judicial discretion,
and courts have the ability to grant conditional discharges. 211 The debtor
is allowed to apply for a discharge within a stipulated period of time after
being adjudged an insolvent. Such a discharge will be granted only if the
debtor fully satisfies any requirements set by the court and/or the official
receiver/trustee.212
2. In Practice. If India has a long-standing formal scheme for consumer
insolvency with an established body of case law, it is nonetheless extremely difficult to discern even the most general aspects of the operation
of this scheme. There are no available data about insolvency cases in India—for example, no state-wide or country-wide data exists concerning
how many cases are filed, who files these cases, how long these cases
take, how many debtors are deemed insolvent, how many of these debtors receive a discharge of debts, and how much debt is discharged. In
addition, the practical effects of a discharge in India are unclear. It is not
clear if individuals who receive a discharge can effectively obtain credit
thereafter. It does not appear that there is any regulation of reaffirmation

charge, or (b) suspend the operation of the order for a specified time, or
(c) grant an order of discharge subject to any conditions with respect to
any earnings or income which may afterwards become due to the insolvent, or with respect to his after-acquired property.
Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act § 38.
207. See BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 106–08; Provincial Insolvency Act
§ 42; Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act § 39.
208. See Provincial Insolvency Act §§ 41, 42(f); Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act §
39.
209. See BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 105; Provincial Insolvency Act §
44; Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act § 45.
210. Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act § 40.
211. See BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 14, 101–05; Provincial Insolvency
Act § 41; Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act § 45.
212. See BHARIHOKE & TALWAR, supra note 170, at 101.
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of discharged debts, a common phenomenon elsewhere, 213 and there is
no available data on whether debtors in India do frequently reaffirm discharged obligations or not.
Furthermore, beyond a handful of authorities that describe the formal
regime and a few selected important cases decided under the insolvency
acts, there is basically no secondary literature on consumer or household
insolvency in India. Consumer bankruptcy is not mentioned at all in the
various reports of the Reserve Bank of India or the National Statistical
Survey. This general silence creates a strong impression that commentators, scholars, and policymakers in India do not believe that the regime is
a significant aspect of Indian society or of its economy. In fact, there are
reasons to doubt that many debtors are inclined to utilize the regime or
that they have reason to believe that it would be useful to do so. The consequences of being deemed an insolvent can be severe while the regime’s
potential benefits to debtors and creditors appear uncertain and may be
slight in many instances. As a threshold matter, it is conventionally understood that insolvency cases move extremely slowly through the judicial system. Furthermore, the substance of India’s insolvency law suggests that debt-relief or stays-of-collection are not readily available and
that judicial outcomes under the laws are unpredictable.
The India Law Commission recently convened a committee with
INSOL India to propose reforms to the consumer insolvency system. The
committee was charged with “examin[ing] the existing laws relating to
personal bankruptcy in India and the desirability of changes in existing
laws in the backdrop of fast increasing and easy availability of credit
from banks, financial institutions and other lenders to individuals for private, family or household purposes.” 214 That committee concluded its
work without making any recommendations. Yet the creation of this
committee may provide evidence that India’s existing consumer bankruptcy system is dysfunctional and marginal in its contemporary context,
failing to provide benefits to consumers or to the broader society. It also
presumably indicates, however, that policymakers believed—at least initially—that there is something worth salvaging and reforming in the existing regime. It may also provide some indication that consumer insolvency law, however dysfunctional it may or may not be, is more salient
in contemporary Indian society than the lack of commentary about it
would indicate.

213. See, e.g., Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Debt after Discharge: An
Empirical Study of Reaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 709 (1999).
214. Committee to Review Personal and Consumer Insolvency, INSOL INDIA,
http://www.insolindia.com/activities.htm#4 (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
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In fact, there are reasons to believe that the role of consumer insolvency in India’s society and economy is underestimated. Based on an informal review of the few dozen reported consumer insolvency-related opinions from the last decade available in Manupatra,215 a commercial legal
database, it appears that a surprising number of consumer insolvency
petitions are filed each year in India. Many of the published and reported
insolvency cases involved involuntary petitions, i.e., those filed by creditors, 216 but many also involve voluntary petitions.217 It is notable that
many of the voluntary petitions appear to have been filed to protect the
debtor from incarceration or otherwise aggressive debt collection.218 It
also appears that many cases do take a shockingly long time to work
their way through the judicial process. 219 Yet there are some indications
215. MANUPATRA, http://www.manupatra.com (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
216. See, e.g., Ram Singh v. VII Additional District Judge and Ors., 2007 A.I.R. 102
(All.); Samar Ghosh v. Rambaran Singh, 1 CAL. L.T. 502 (2006); R. Subramaniam v.
Canara Bank and Anr., (2006) 134 Comp. Cas. 363 (Mad.); T.T.V. Dhinakaran v. Dy.
Director, Enforcement Directorate, 2003 A.I.R. 59 (Mad.); Nawratam Purohit v. Arvind
Agarwal, 2008 A.I.R. 70 (Cal.); Deepak Cochhar and Anr. v. Indusind Bank Ltd., (2006)
3 Bom. C.R. 520; Kanakasubbu and Anr. v. Suryanarayana Shastri and Ors., 2002 A.I.R.
252 (Mad.); Sadasivam v. M. Muthuswamy and Ors., 1998 (2) C.T.C. 238 (Mad.); Dhirendra, 2003 C.R. 5 (Bom.) 161; Sicom Limited, 2007 A.I.R. 70 (Cal.); Kishor K. Mehta,
2008 MhLj 1 (Bom.) 451.
217. See, e.g., Pinnamshetty Kavitha, A.I.R. 2007 (A.P.) 239; Mohammed Abbas Ali,
2007 A.L.D. 1 (A.P.) 60; Garre Venkata Lakshminarayana, A.I.R. 2007 A.P. 54; Padala
Bulli Bhami Reddy, 2006 A.L.D. 4 (A.P.) 30; Elluri Venkata Sai Surya Prakasa Rao v.
Guttikonda Srirama Murthy and Ors., A.L.D. 152 (2007); T. Chandrasekharaiah v. D.
Sreeramulu Chetty and Ors., 2005 A.I.R. 195 (A.P.); Anna Venkata Subbaiah v. Official
Receiver, 6 A.L.D. 619 (2004); Navin Jhunjhunwala v. Vijay Kumar Sharma, 1 CAL.
L.T. 511 (2005); Sure Venkateshwarlu v. More Goverdhan and Ors., 2001 A.I.R. 473
(A.P.); Dasari Srihari Rao v. Talluri Harinadha Babu, 3 A.L.D. 456 (2002); G. Subba Rao
v. Food Corporation of India and Ors., 2004 A.I.R. 16 (A.P.); Kasa Venkata Reddy v.
Syed Basha and Ors., 4 A.L.D. 210 (2004); Papuri Daveedu v. Banavath Lokhya and
Anr., 4 A.L.D. 559 (2005); Kajal Gan v. Smt. Hazara Khatun and Ors., 2006 A.I.R. 157
(Ass.); Shah Bakuleshbhai Hasmukulal v. Kaushikkumar Kantilal Modi and Ors., 2008
A.I.R. 133 (Guj.); B. Venkata Nagaraju v. P. Ramadasu and Ors., 3 A.L.D. 556 (2004);
Ram Singh Jaiswal v. Central Bank of India and Anr., 2 JCR 39 (2003); Sudhandiran,
A.I.R. 2006 (Mad.) 10; D.P. Karthikeyan v. Canara Bank Thirunagar Branch, (2003) 116
Comp. Cas. 582 (Mad.); Venkatachalam Chetty, 2000 (2) C.T.C. (Mad.) 288.
218. See, e.g., Elluri Venkata Sai Surya Prakasa Rao, A.L.D. 152 (2007); Navin Jhunjhunwala, 1 CAL. L.T. 511 (2005); Sure Venkateshwarlu, 2001 A.I.R. 473 (A.P.); Munaswami v. K. Mallikarjuna, MANU/AP/1308/2001; Kasa Venkata Reddy, 4 A.L.D. 210
(2004); Papuri Daveedu, 4 A.L.D. 559 (2005).
219. See, e.g., Yogini Chandrakant Mehta v. The Official Assignee, (1999) 2 Bom.
CR. 719 (petition filed in 1977); Dasari Srihari Rao, 3 A.L.D. 456 (2002) (petition filed
in 1984); P. Lakshmipathi Chetty v. P. Janardhana Chetty and Ors., 5 A.L.D. 723 (2007)
(petition filed in 1997); Ram Singh, 2007 A.I.R. 102 (All.) (petition filed in 1967); Mo-
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that cases filed recently may be more likely to be resolved quicker than
older cases, sometimes within a year or two.220
Because most insolvency proceedings do not result in published opinions, it is impossible to deduce reliable information about filing rates
from these reported decisions, nearly all of which are appellate decisions.
Yet these decisions provide an intriguing glimpse into the insolvency
system. In one notable case from the state of Andhra Pradesh, Mohammed Abbas Ali v. Masood Bin Mohammed Al-Khaili, 221 the high
court requested clerks in every district of that state to report on the number of insolvency petitions pending at the time. The court stated that the
district court clerks reported a total of 6,113 petitions pending. Andhra
Pradesh, India’s fourth largest state, had a population of 75.7 million in
2001, so six thousand insolvency petitions is a small number per capita.
Nonetheless, this figure suggests that a non-trivial number of individuals—debtors as well as creditors—view it to be in their interest to employ the regime. It may also reveal that the existing legal regime plays a
more significant role in Indian society than is currently understood. Assuming that a legal regime can have meaningful impact beyond the dishammed Abbas Ali, 2007 A.L.D. 1 (A.P.) 60 (petition filed in 1998); Padala Bulli Bhami
Reddy, 2006 A.L.D. 4 (A.P.) 30 (petition filed in 1998); Hemant M. Nabar v. Farohar
and Co., (2005) 5 Bom. CR. 234 (petition filed in 1999); T. Chandrasekharaiah, 2005
A.I.R. 195 (A.P.) (petition filed in 1994); Anna Venkata Subbaiah, 6 A.L.D. 619 (2004)
(petition filed prior to 1980); Nawratam Purohit, 2008 A.I.R. 70 (Cal.) (petition filed in
1995); Kanakasubbu and Anr., 2002 A.I.R. 252 (Mad.) (petition filed in 1994); Sadasivam, 1998 (2) C.T.C. 238 (Mad.) (petition filed in 1984); Kajal Gan, 2006 A.I.R. 157
(Ass.) (petition filed in 1986); B. Venkata Nagaraju, 3 A.L.D. 556 (2004) (petition filed
in 1992); Ram Singh Jaiswal, 2 JCR 39 (2003) (petition filed in 1987); Venkatachalam
Chetty, 2000 (2) C.T.C. 288 (Mad.) (petition filed in 1989).
220. See, e.g., Sure Venkateshwarlu, 2001 A.I.R. 473 (A.P.) (petition filed in 1999);
Pinnamshetty Kavitha, A.I.R. 2007 (A.P.) 239 (debtor filed petition in 2005); Garre Venkata Lakshminarayana, A.I.R. 2007 A.P. 54 (petition filed in 2004); Samar Ghosh, 1
CAL. L.T. 502 (2006) (petition filed in 2005); Elluri Venkata Sai Surya Prakasa Rao,
A.L.D. 152 (2007) (petition filed in 2003); P.S.K. Finance and Chit Funds v. R. Govindhan, (2004) 5 C.T.C. 330 (petition filed in 2002); Navin Jhunjhunwala, 1 CAL. L.T. 511
(2005) (petition filed in 2003); Kasa Venkata Reddy, 4 A.L.D. 210 (2004) (petition filed
in 1998); T.T.V. Dhinakaran, 2003 A.I.R. 59 (Mad.) (petition filed in 2001); Papuri Daveedu, 4 A.L.D. 559 (2005) (petition filed in 2004); Deepak Cochhar and Anr., (2006) 3
Bom. C.R. 520 (petition filed in 2003); Shah Bakuleshbhai Hasmukulal v. Kaushikkumar
Kantilal Modi and Ors., 2008 A.I.R. 133 (Guj.) (petition filed in 2007); Sudhandiran,
A.I.R. 2006 (Mad.) 10 (petition filed in 2000); D.P. Karthikeyan, (2003) 116 Comp. Cas.
582 (Mad.) (petition filed in 2000); Sicom Limited v. Bajranglal and Suresh Jain, 2007
A.I.R. 70 (Cal.) (petition filed in 2003); Kishor K. Mehta, 2008 MhLj 1 (Bom.) 451 (petition filed in 2005).
221. Mohammed Abbas Ali v. Masood Bin Mohammed Al-Khaili and Anr., 2007
A.L.D. 1 (A.P.) 60
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putes and cases that are decided under it, India’s insolvency regime likely has a broader impact on that country’s consumer financial markets
than is generally appreciated. Perhaps most significantly, it suggests that
consumer insolvency may be salient enough in Indian society that effective reforms could have a meaningful impact.
C. Potential Reform
As the India Law Commission’s decision to convene a committee on
consumer insolvency may reflect, India appears to be experiencing many
of the factors that have influenced other countries to adopt or modernize
their insolvency laws. These factors include rising incomes, general policies promoting entrepreneurship, deregulation of consumer financial
transactions, increased consumer indebtedness, and weaknesses in other
social insurance programs. 222 As discussed above, India has liberalized
and deregulated its credit markets in recent decades.223 Consumer borrowing in that country has grown dramatically, 224 and there are various
signs of growing household over-indebtedness. 225 While India has a wide
array of social insurance programs, 226 these programs have many shortcomings, 227 and they are arguably not keeping pace with the demands of
a developing economy. 228 Finally, there appears to be a growing commitment among Indian policy-makers to support innovative entrepreneurial activity.
222. See generally Efrat, supra note 166; Feibelman, supra note 8, at 95–97 & nn.128–
30.
223. See supra notes 63–71 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 25–44 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
226. In light of government policies of India in the first few decades of its independence, it should not be surprising that the country has a wide array of social insurance
programs. It appears that most of these programs are based on national laws and are administered by the national government and, in some cases, state governments. The primary laws in this area include the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (“WCA”); the Employee’s State Insurance Act, 1948 (“ESIA”); the Employees’ Provident Funds Act, 1952
(“EPFA”); Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (“MBA”); and the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972
(“PGA”). Together, these major programs provide covered and eligible individuals in the
labor force with death and disability benefits, retirement benefits, maternity benefits, and
unemployment benefits. It appears that these programs are financed with public support,
employer contributions, and, in some cases, direct employee contributions. Despite the
broad scope of these programs, they are far from comprehensive. The coverage and eligibility requirements of these programs exclude large segments of the population. For an
excellent discussion of social insurance programs in India, see Agarwala & Khan, supra
note 54.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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Assuming that India’s consumer insolvency regime is operational yet
dysfunctional in many crucial respects, it is entirely possible that the regime could be markedly improved with carefully designed reforms. This
Part does not argue that Indian policymakers should adopt any particular
reform. Rather, it assumes that the role of consumer insolvency law in
India can be enhanced, and it discusses some general approaches to reforming the regime that might help achieve this result. By posing possible avenues for reform, it aims to spur additional research into the threshold question of whether India’s insolvency regime can in fact play a
more beneficial role in Indian society.
1. Procedural Reforms. For any consumer insolvency regime to meaningfully help address the costs of over-indebtedness and promote efficient expansion of consumer financial markets, it should be viable
enough to influence consumer financial transactions ex ante and to affect
the relationships between creditors and debtors ex post, especially their
motivations to renegotiate. Assuming that timeliness and predictability
could make India’s insolvency regime more appealing to at least some
subset of creditors and debtors, such reforms could prove valuable even
if the substantive rules of the regimes are otherwise suboptimal. One obvious way to make India’s insolvency system timelier is to make general
improvements in the capacity of the Indian judicial system. 229 But such
an ambitious undertaking may be an unreasonable near-term goal. If so,
policymakers in India might consider adopting an altogether new institutional mechanism. They could, for example, adopt a distinct and separate
set of tribunals for consumer insolvency cases, perhaps making much of
the consumer insolvency process more administrative in nature. Yet,
previous efforts to create new debt and insolvency-related tribunals in
India may provide reasons to be skeptical of such an approach. 230
More modestly, policymakers might be able to make meaningful improvements in the administration of consumer insolvency cases by addressing aspects of the existing regime that tend to slow cases down and
make their resolution relatively unpredictable. At least some of these aspects of the existing regime could be replaced with rules that apply automatically or that require less judicial energy. For example, such reforms might eliminate the requirement that courts determine that a debtor
229. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Jayanth Krishnan, “Bread for the Poor”: Access to
Justice and the Rights of the Needy in India, 55 HAST. L.J. 789 (2004) (discussing systemic problems with India’s formal legal system).
230. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. Cf. Galanter & Krishnan, supra note
229 (describing one innovative legal mechanism adopted in India in recent decades, the
Lok Adalat, and expressing some skepticism about the success of this institution).
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is insolvent before applying any other substantive rules. Instead, a debtor
in bankruptcy (either voluntarily or involuntarily) could be considered
presumptively insolvent unless a party proved otherwise. Similarly, rules
allowing courts to stay other proceedings or to grant discharge of debts
currently give presiding judges significant discretion. If these rules were
reformed to allow less judicial discretion, this might increase the speed
and the predictability of the insolvency regime.
Such reforms to consumer insolvency law in India would be consistent
with some broad trends in consumer insolvency and bankruptcy regimes
across the globe in recent decades. Consumer insolvency and bankruptcy
laws have arguably been tending toward the more automatic and less discretionary, especially in the Anglo-American contexts. 231 Long-term developments in United Kingdon (“UK”) insolvency law, the initial model
for India’s regime, may provide a particularly useful point of comparison. The UK’s insolvency regime was meaningfully reformed, beginning
in the 1970’s, to streamline the process of granting a discharge of
debts. 232 Before these reforms, judges had significant discretion in granting a discharge to debtors in bankruptcy. 233 The process of obtaining a
discharge generally involved a public hearing to determine whether the
debtor was entitled to discharge. 234 The reforms provided that first-time
bankruptcy filers could obtain a more automatic discharge of debts after
three years by turning over their non-exempt assets. 235 That discharge
process was subsequently reformed, 236 enabling most debtors who file

231. In the U.S. context, recent bankruptcy reforms were designed in large part to reduce the discretion of bankruptcy judges in deciding whether debtors should be able to
file under Chapter 7 and how much debtors should be required to repay under Chapter 13.
See, e.g., Lauren E. Tribble, Judicial Discretion and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
Act, 57 DUKE L.J. 789 (2007). But see Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S.Ct. 2464 (2010) (rejecting a rigid mechanical approach to these determinations under the recent reforms).
232. See, e.g., Efrat, supra note 166, at 86–89. See generally IAN F. FLETCHER, THE
LAW OF INSOLVENCY (1990); Douglass G. Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional, and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 69
(1982).
233. Boshkoff, supra note 232.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 88–89. During that period, at least some of the debtor’s post-petition income
is available to creditors, and the debtor is subject to numerous disabilities. Id.
236. See JASON J. KILBORN, COMPARATIVE CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 88 (2007); Iain
Ramsay, Bankruptcy in Transition: The Case of England and Wales—The Neo-Liberal
Cuckoo in the European Bankruptcy Nest?, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE 212, 218–22 (Johanna Niemi-Kiesiläinen, Iain Ramsay & William Whitford, eds., 2003) [hereinafter Ramsay, Bankruptcy in Transition: The Case of England
and Wales].

118

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 36:1

for bankruptcy to obtain a discharge within a year of filing. 237 The foregoing points are merely illustrative—the experience in England may indicate that strategic reforms of India’s insolvency law can yield appreciable results. It is not meant to suggest that India should simply adopt the
various reforms made to the English regime in recent decades.
If coupled with procedural reforms to improve the administration of insolvency cases, policymakers in India might also expand the role and
functioning of the regime by making it easier for consumers to voluntarily file for bankruptcy and harder (perhaps impossible) for them to be
forced into bankruptcy involuntarily. Again, if more consumers are willing and able to file a petition of insolvency, insolvency law will be more
likely to affect consumer financial transactions ex ante and ex post.
Eliminating involuntary petitions might reduce the stigma associated
with the regime. It may also help convey to debtors that insolvency law
can serve their interests and that it is not simply a form of punishment or
purely a debt-collection tool. Allowing for involuntary filing presumably
protects creditors from debtors’ inclinations to waste assets or to transfer
those assets to other parties. But creditors can effectively push debtors
into bankruptcy by acting to enforce their obligations; and, ideally, they
should be able to recover fraudulent transfers under insolvency and/or
non-insolvency law. Reducing some of the formal disabilities associated
with being an insolvent and reducing the occasions for public insolvency
hearings might also reduce the stigma associated with insolvency. Finally, it is worth noting that completely eliminating imprisonment for debt
may also help reduce the stigma associated with insolvency law; debtors
would no longer have reason to be concerned that filing for insolvency
would indicate that they were otherwise facing imprisonment.
Making insolvency more attractive may run the risk of giving debtors
bad incentives to become over-indebted or to seek a discharge when they
could actually repay. However, given the direct costs of bankruptcy, including legal fees and the impact on a debtor’s credit rating, as well as
the strong likelihood that some degree of stigma will continue to be associated with insolvency, it is entirely possible that the opposite problem
will occur—people who should file for bankruptcy will not do so. This is
arguably the case in the United States, for example. 238 And it is worth
noting that, while there was a substantial increase in filings after the lat-

237. Ramsay, Functionalism and Political Economy in the Comparative Study of Consumer Insolvency, supra note 8, at 646; KILBORN, supra note 236, at 88–89.
238. See, e.g., Michelle White, Why Don’t More Households File for Bankruptcy?, 14
J. L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1998).
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est round of reforms of bankruptcy law in England, 239 filing rates are still
relatively low in England compared to other countries with advanced
economies. 240
2. Expanding Debt-Relief. Expanding the availability of substantive
protections and the scope of potential discharge of debts might also increase the beneficial impact of insolvency law on economic growth and
development in India. Like the procedural reforms discussed above, it
would presumably make the regime more appealing to consumers in financial distress, potentially expanding the relevance of the regime in Indian society. Beyond that, however, it could have a more direct effect on
consumer financial markets by influencing credit-granting decisions and
reducing the costs of over-indebtedness. If utilized, a regime with more
generous debt-relief could obviously reduce some of the direct ex post
costs of over-indebtedness. Assuming that India’s social safety net is
shrinking relative to the expanding economy, 241 the social insurance
function of consumer insolvency law might serve a vital role in reducing
the numbers of individuals who fall back into poverty, thereby taxing the
broader economy. It might also help build popular support for development policies more generally. Finally, it might promote entrepreneurship
and other productive economic risk-taking within Indian society.
Less intuitively, broader measures of debt-relief might also prove especially beneficial in a context like India by disciplining the extension of
credit to borrowers in that country ex ante. Increasing the scope and
availability of discharge or increasing the amount of property exemptions
would presumably encourage creditors to make efforts to lend to consumers who are more likely to be able to repay their obligations. It is important to note that this might prove disadvantageous to some consumers
who are marginally creditworthy or who cannot establish their creditworthiness. It might also prove disadvantageous to lenders who do not have
access to good information about their borrowers and might benefit moneylenders, who may have some informational advantages over formal
lenders. 242 If so, formal lenders would then have incentives to invest in
more sophisticated credit reporting and credit scoring. The country’s new

239. See Ramsay, Functionalism and Political Economy in the Comparative Study of
Consumer Insolvency, supra note 8, at 651.
240. See id. at 626. Ramsay argues that these reforms were aimed to help expand consumer financial markets more than to address consumer over-indebtedness. See id. at
646–47.
241. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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national credit bureau243 should prove especially valuable in this context.
As conditions for the dissemination and evaluation of information improve in India, any advantage that moneylenders might currently have
should diminish. Thus, for better or worse, one of the long-term effects
of introducing a broader and more effective discharge provision might be
to push some informal lenders out of the market.
3. Whither Demand for Reform? If reforming the procedural and/or
substantive aspects of the Indian consumer insolvency regime is a good
idea, it is fair to ask why Indian policymakers have not already implemented such reforms. The fact that the India Law Commission’s committee on consumer insolvency reform did not recommend any reforms may
indicate that such reforms are actually not needed. Or it may reflect that
such reforms, though needed, are not practically or politically feasible.
Assuming that expanding the discharge is desirable in theory, implementing the reform would inevitably face significant practical challenges. It is probably not a coincidence that many countries with developing economies like India have resisted adopting or liberalizing bankruptcy relief.244 Creditors, always a powerful political force, are presumably wary of such reforms, policymakers might be conservative in their
concerns about the effects of reform, or policymakers might have reasonable concerns about the administerability of a higher-energy bankruptcy regime. 245 It is possible that Indian society is simply not prepared
to embrace a different kind of consumer insolvency law. Finally, it is
possible that regulatory actions by the Reserve Bank of India, including
the new codes for lenders and the program for settlements of small loans,
approximate some aspects of an effective consumer insolvency regime,
lessening the need for bankruptcy reform.
Yet there are good reasons to believe that India might prove relatively
fertile ground for an expanded consumer insolvency or bankruptcy regime. As noted above, 246 Indian society and its economy are experiencing many of the factors—like increasing consumer credit—that can make
243. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
244. See Jose Reinaldo De Lima Lopes, Consumer Bankruptcy and Over-indebtedness
in Brazil, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 236, at 85, 86;
Xian Chu Zhang, Development of Consumer Credit in China and Concerns About the
Underlying Legal Infrastructure, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE,
supra note 236.
245. See Feibelman, supra note 8. For an excellent study of the complex process of
introducing and reforming corporate bankruptcy law in emerging economies, see
TERENCE HALLIDAY & BRUCE CARRUTHERS, BANKRUPT: GLOBAL LAWMAKING AND
SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009).
246. See supra notes 224–29 and accompanying text.
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consumer insolvency law more beneficial. Furthermore, the country has
had a formal insolvency regime—one including a discharge provision—
for nearly 100 years. The widely-perceived pitfalls of efforts to “transplant” legal regimes, 247 including bankruptcy laws, 248 from one context
to another largely reflects that unique domestic social and cultural factors
are crucial to the success of legal development in any setting. In many
instances, debt relief is simply an uncomfortable concept or institution
for a society to embrace. Increasing the scope and role of consumer insolvency in India would not require introducing Indian society to the
concept of debt-relief. Rather, it would require the society to make a shift
in its conception of an existing institution. Finally, as the recent insolvency case law from India suggests, there is already some demand for
consumer insolvency law in India among Indian citizens, and reforming
that legal regime may release some additional pent-up demand. Such
demand is likely a prerequisite for the success of any reform. 249
Indian policymakers appear to have some latitude, then, to strategically
make important but modest reforms to that country’s insolvency regime
and to do so in ways that respond to distinct characteristics of Indian society. Doing so might make individuals in financial distress more willing
to employ the regime and might make the regime more effective when
employed, promoting the long-term growth and development in that
country. The more immediate question is whether there is sufficient concern among India’s consumers, its policymakers, or international actors
with leverage in that country to more systematically explore the potential
benefits of reforming that country’s consumer insolvency law.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are reasons to believe that improvements in the regulation of
consumer financial markets in India can promote broader economic
growth in that country. But the extent of that potential benefit depends on
the ability of Indian policymakers to address and limit the costs associated with consumer over-indebtedness. A higher-energy consumer insolvency law regime may prove to be a valuable component of policies
in India that are designed to facilitate expansion of consumer finance and
to reduce the costs of consumer indebtedness. Although it appears that
India’s consumer insolvency law regime is employed by tens of thou247. See, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The
Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163, 167 (2003).
248. See, e.g., Nathalie Martin, The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: The Perils of Legal Transplantation, 28 B.C. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 1, 77 (2005).
249. See Berkowitz et al., supra note 247.
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sands of debtors and creditors each year, it also appears that the regime is
dysfunctional in many respects. For the regime to better serve its potential functions, it may need to become more expeditious and predictable; it
may also need to provide somewhat more generous relief to insolvent
consumer debtors. These reforms need not be fundamental. Reforming a
handful of provisions to reduce the judicial acts and decisions required
by the current regime might significantly improve the role it plays in Indian society. If Indian policymakers succeed in making the country’s
consumer insolvency regime at least somewhat speedier and more predictable, then the regime may not only help reduce the ex post costs of
over-indebtedness, it may also improve the ex ante efficiency of consumer financial markets. Either effect might promote the continued deepening of consumer financial markets and, in turn, contribute to broader
measures of growth and development in India.

